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Introduction
The Great Recession prompted several governments and central banks in ad-
vanced economies to take exceptional measures, whose consequences are still vis-
ible today. In particular, two developments seem to be noteworthy. First, many
governments’ debt-to-GDP ratios are high with no sign of returning to pre-crisis
levels, raising concerns about their sustainability. Second, interest rates are low
and in some countries at the effective lower bound, reducing monetary policies’
room for manoeuvre.
This thesis investigates several implications of these two consequences of the crisis
for fiscal and monetary policy. The first two chapters focus on means to reduce
the debt-to-GDP ratio, either by generating primary surpluses through budgetary
adjustments (chapter 1) or by directly lowering the interest rates on government
debt due to financial repression (chapter 2). The last chapter evaluates the
impact of interest rate forward guidance, an important tool for central banks to
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy at the effective lower bound.
In the first chapter of the thesis, entitled ‘Fiscal Consolidation with long-term
Public Debt’, I compare the macroeconomic implications of expenditure-based
vs. tax-based consolidation and find that tax-hikes can be less disruptive. This
depends on the dynamics of the governments’ real debt-servicing costs during
consolidation periods, since a lower real rate reduces the need to adjust pri-
mary surpluses and thus dampens the distortionary impact that both fiscal re-
trenchments entail (and vice versa). Within a New Keynesian framework which
features an extended maturity structure of public debt to better account for
interest rate dynamics, I show that the average maturity of government debt de-
termines whether tax-hikes and spending-cuts increase or decrease the real rate.
Calibrated to match US debt characteristics in 2018, tax-based consolidation is
found to be welfare enhancing, since higher taxes lower long-term real rates. If
debt would be only short-term, spending should be reduced instead.
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Chapter 2 is entitled ‘Financial Repression in General Equilibrium’ and joint
work with Alexander Kriwoluzky and Gernot Mu¨ller. We assess the impact of
financial repression – a set of regulatory policies to keep the interest rates on
government debt artificially low – in the US during the post-WW2 period. We
provide a measure of the “laissez-faire interest rate”, the interest rate that would
have prevailed in the absence of financial repression, on the basis of a medium-
scale dynamic general equilibrium model, in which the banking sector is a captive
audience for public liabilities. Our estimates indicate that the laissez-faire rate
on government bonds is considerably higher than the actual interest rate at the
time. All else equal, this implies that about half of the observed decline of the
debt ratio was due to repression. However, once we take into account that in the
absence of repression the private and public sector would have evolved differently,
we find that repression actually slowed down the reduction of the debt ratio.
The last chapter of the thesis, entitled ‘The Power of Forward Guidance in a
Quantitative TANK Model’ and joint work with Rafael Gerke and Sebastian
Giesen, quantifies the macroeconomic effects of interest rate forward guidance
within an estimated medium-scale Two-Agent New Keynesian (TANK) model
of the EA economy. The mere introduction of hand-to-mouth households that
cannot smooth consumption has two opposing effects on the power of forward
guidance compared to a representative agent model. While the direct effect
reduces its impact, as there is less intertemporal smoothing, the indirect effect
raises its impact since hand-to-mouth households have a higher marginal propen-
sity to consume. Although the overall effect is a priori ambiguous, our estimates
indicate that the power of forward guidance is dampened, as there is sufficient
countercyclical redistribution which weakens the indirect effect. An interaction
of forward guidance with central bank asset purchases gives rise to non-linear
effects that depend on the horizon of forward guidance.
2
Chapter 1
Fiscal Consolidation with
long-term Public Debt
1.1 Introduction
Following the onset of the Great Recession, several advanced economies – apart
from Germany – experienced a sharp increase in their public debt levels with no
sign of returning to pre-crisis levels (see Figure 1.1). With poor growth prospects
and low inflation expected in the coming years, there is a need for considerable
budget cuts if these countries want to reduce their public debt ratios to more
typical and sustainable levels.
In this paper, I compare the macroeconomic implications of tax-based (TB) and
expenditure-based (EB) consolidations and find that TB adjustments can be
less disruptive than EB ones. I arrive at this result using a framework that
allows to focus on the role of (real) interest rate dynamics in the evolution of
government debt. The vast (empirical) literature on the compositional effects
of fiscal adjustments typically finds that spending-cuts outperform tax-hikes,
especially when success is measured based on their respective impacts on GDP
growth (e.g. Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi, 2019; Alesina and Ardagna, 2010;
Alesina, Favero and Giavazzi, 2015; Von Hagen, Hallett and Strauch, 2002).
Focusing on output is natural: if consolidation induces sharp recessions, the
debt-to-GDP ratio increases.
However, to predominantly measure success by evaluating growth implications
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Figure 1.1: Evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019.
General government net lending/borrowing; Percent of GDP; downloaded on 24.07.2019.
ignores the importance of interest rates for government bonds, which also directly
affect the evolution of public debt ratios. To take these two channels into account,
I put forward a stylized New Keynesian model to conceptually show the way a
budgetary adjustment interacts with the (real) interest rate of public liabilities.
The main mechanism also holds true in a medium-scale DSGE model. I focus
on a permanent reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio and discuss the normative
question of how different fiscal consolidation strategies affect welfare. To allow a
meaningful trade-off, the provision of public goods enhances welfare, but it is only
an imperfect substitute for private consumption. Labor taxes are proportional
to the agents’ labor income and distort labor supply decisions.
I begin the analysis by assessing the long-term macroeconomic implications of
permanently lower debt levels with the model calibrated to 2018 US data. The
debt level has a non-trivial effect on the economy as the resulting interest ex-
penses for the government have to be financed by distortionary taxes (Ricardian
Equivalence does not apply). Hence, reducing the debt ratio results in a lower
average debt servicing cost and frees up resources that can be allocated to ei-
ther higher spending, lower tax rates or a combination of both. I determine the
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optimal composition of tax rates and government expenditure that maximizes
the households’ welfare in steady state for a given debt level, following Adam
(2011). This particular allocation method is described in section 1.3. A steady-
state comparison of welfare when debt ratios are 100% (roughly the current US
value), 90% and 80% indicates (unsurprisingly) that households would be better
off with less debt.
However, a long-term comparison disguises the fact that reaching lower public
debt ratios requires cuts in expenditures or increases in tax rates during the tran-
sition (if other means like greater growth are not available). Hence, one must take
the transitional adjustment costs into account for a comprehensive analysis. Fis-
cal consolidation is obtained using simple feedback rules that increase (decrease)
the labor tax rate (government spending) if the actual debt-to-GDP ratio is above
the target. The exogenous target rate is gradually reduced from 100% (roughly
the current US value) to 90% within 10 years, i.e., a reduction of 10pp (Coenen,
Mohr and Straub, 2008; Cogan, Taylor, Wieland and Wolters, 2013). Monetary
policy follows a simple Taylor rule.
To capture the response of interest rate dynamics, the model features an extended
maturity structure of public debt, following the approach by Krause and Moyen
(2016). This is well suited to clarifying how various interest rates are related.
Specifically, it distinguishes between the short-term policy rate that is set by the
central bank, the interest rate on newly issued (long-term) government debt and
the average interest rate the government has to pay on its outstanding (long-
term) liabilities.1 These distinctions are important since not every change in the
policy rate or the current interest rate of newly issued bonds directly affects the
average rate on outstanding bonds, unless the entire public debt has maturity of
one period. However, it is the average interest rate – alongside output growth and
surplus – that shapes public debt dynamics. Hence, a maturity structure for debt
determines the extent to which the debt servicing costs will change in response
to fiscal adjustments. Empirically, governments have issued long maturity debts
quite regularly in the past. As Table 1.1 illustrates, the average maturities range
between 6 and 9 years for the G7 countries as of 2018, except for the UK, where
it is as high as 16 years.
The main result of this paper is that tax-based consolidations can be less dis-
ruptive than spending-based ones. I arrive at this conclusion by comparing the
1This is not the case with (Woodford, 2001) where all the debt is reissued every period.
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Table 1.1: Average maturity of debt in years as of 2018
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
8.3 8 6.3 7.3 8.9 15.8 5.7
Source: ECB, Government Statistics, Average residual maturity of debt; Debt management
report of the respective non euro countries.
macroeconomic effects of tax-based (TB) and expenditure-based (EB) budgetary
adjustments with two measures: first, the“fiscal sacrifice ratio” (FSR) that quan-
tifies the output loss for a given reduction in debt and second, the welfare equiv-
alent consumption variation (CV).
The mechanism behind the result is straightforward: in the model, tax-based
consolidations are associated with lower average interest rates on outstanding
public liabilities, and this accommodates the fiscal retrenchment. Such a benign
effect lowers the need to adjust tax revenues and mitigates the adverse effects
of a rising labor tax wedge. Similarly, cutting government expenditures raises
the average interest rates on public debt. To counteract the impact of rising
rates for the debt-to-GDP ratio, spending must be cut more forcefully, thereby
aggravating the recession. The interest rate response depends on two aspects.
First, TB plans increase inflation while EB ones have a dampening effect on the
aggregate price level.2 Through the lens of the model, raising labor tax rates
lowers disposable income, inducing households to demand higher pre-tax wages
to compensate part of this loss in income. Since wages are marginal costs for
the firms, they charge higher prices (Eggertsson, 2011).3 Conversely, with a
reduction in public purchases, prices become lower as firms try to attract private
demand. These effects of tax- and spending-based consolidations on the inflation
rate are well in line with empirical findings (see e.g. Alesina et al., 2015; Mertens
and Ravn, 2013).
Second, if the average maturity of public debt is long enough, the nominal average
interest rate reacts less than one-to-one with the inflation rate. This is the
case even though monetary policy follows the Taylor-principle, i.e., the nominal
and real (short-term) interest rates react more than one-to-one with inflation.
2I use the terms tax-based/expenditure-based consolidation, TB/EB-plans and tax-
hikes/spending-cuts interchangeably.
3The reduction in disposable income also dampens demand which urges firms to actually
cut their prices. However, the cost channel seems to dominate in general. Only for incredibly
high tax hikes (over double the size) prices will fall.
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However, with an extended maturity structure of public debt, only part of the
outstanding stock of liabilities is reissued at new (higher/lower) interest rates.4
For the other part, nominal rates are predetermined. Hence, the real average
interest rate – the rate the government has to pay on its outstanding debt –
declines when inflation is high (i.e. with TB plans), while it increases when
inflation is low (EB plans).
The above results get reversed when only short-term debt is considered. In
this case, the dynamics of real average interest rates are more affected by the
dynamics of the short-term policy rate and less by inflation. In such a scenario,
tax-hikes actually raise the governments’ real debt servicing costs and thus cause
a stronger and more persistent recession. Accordingly, the FSR is much higher
than compared to the spending-based adjustment. The sacrifice ratio and welfare
measure in my analysis show that for public debts with average maturities over
two – four years (the current case for the US), tax-based budgetary adjustments
should be favored over spending-based ones.
In a sensitivity analysis, I first quantify the impact of consolidation if the econ-
omy is stuck at the effective lower bound (ELB). I simulate a negative demand
shock that brings the economy to the ELB for four quarters. I then look at the
contrast between tax-based and spending-based consolidations. As mentioned
above, although TB plans increase inflation and inflation expectations, monetary
policy cannot counteract these pressures as it is stuck at the ELB. Nevertheless,
higher expected inflation causes the real interest rate to fall, which mitigates the
depth of the recession (at least in the first three quarters – a case of expansion-
ary austerity). As a result, the economy leaves the ELB already after the third
quarter. Similarly, spending-cuts aggravate the recession since monetary policy
cannot accommodate the shortfall in demand and inflation, thereby raising real
rates. Second, I show that the main mechanism in the paper would also hold in
a medium-scale DSGE model (following Carlstrom, Fuerst and Paustian, 2017).
Several recent contributions explore various aspects of fiscal consolidation. As
mentioned above, one important distinction is the composition of budgetary ad-
justments.5 In a similar vein, one could compare the magnitude of fiscal multipli-
4Additionally, as will be explained in detail below, the interest rate of newly issued (long-
term) bonds is a weighted average of the current and expected short-term rates, which further
cushions the change in average interest rates.
5However, this view is not unchallenged. Part of the literature identifies the size of consol-
idation or whether consolidation has been implemented successfully as more important than
the composition. See, for instance, Ardagna (2004), Holden and Midthjell (2013) or Wiese,
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ers; for instance, see the recent survey by Ramey (2019). The multiplier is indeed
one important ingredient to decide which fiscal composition to exploit. However,
this isolated assessment overlooks the interaction with interest rate dynamics.
When the average maturity of debt is high, taxes must be raised less in order to
reduce the debt ratio.
An argument in favor of expenditure-based consolidations over tax-based ones
is that monetary policy helps mitigate potential adverse effects in the former
while exacerbating it in the latter (see for instance Guajardo, Leigh and Pesca-
tori, 2014; Erceg and Linde´, 2013; Romei, 2017; Bi, Leeper and Leith, 2013).
For example, Erceg and Linde´ (2013) use a medium-scale two-country DSGE
model to compare the effects of TB and EB plans with different degrees of mon-
etary policy accommodation. They find that with an independent central bank,
government spending-cuts are the less costly method of reducing public debt
than tax-hikes. In a currency union, however, the central bank provides too
little accommodation as it focuses on union-wide aggregates only. Therefore,
expenditure-based consolidation depresses output a lot more in the short run.6
Bi et al. (2013) study how uncertainty about the timing (at which debt levels
consolidation starts) and composition (when a raise in taxes is expected but a
reduction in spending is realized) affects macroeconomic performances. They set
up a New Keynesian model with short-term debt and emphasize that the behavior
of short real interest rate determines whether stabilizing government debt will
be successful or not. In a similar vein, Romei (2017) argues that spending-based
consolidation is preferable in a New Keynesian Model with heterogeneous agents
where households can vote for each policy option. She states that it is especially
preferable to have lower financing costs when consolidation takes place; in her
paper, this is the case when spending-based adjustments are implemented.7
All three papers emphasize that their respective result is driven by the response of
real interest rates on government debt during the period of consolidation. How-
ever, they all rely on short-term debt. My paper shows how the introduction of
long-term debt overturns the dynamics of the real average interest rate compared
to short-term debt. It would be interesting to see how the above results might
Jong-A-Pin and de Haan (2018).
6The ELB scenario from above is in spirit similar to a currency union, as in both cases the
monetary authority reacts relatively less strongly to the inflation rate.
7In a related paper, Hommes, Lustenhouwer and Mavromatis (2018) show that EB plans
can lead to larger recessions if heterogeneity of expectations is taken into account.
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change if an extended maturity of public debt is included.
Another stream of the literature focuses on fiscal consolidations within different
macroeconomic environments such as accompanying structural reforms (Vogel,
2012), political economy aspects (Pappa, Sajedi and Vella, 2015) or private debt
deleveraging (Andre´s, Arce and Thomas, 2018).8 The latter focus on how long-
term private debt insulates the income of households from the recessive impact of
fiscal retrenchment. Similarly, my model shows how the introduction of long-term
bonds shields the government’s interest expenses from changes in the short-run
interest rate.
In terms of an empirical (successful) debt reduction, Hall and Sargent (2011)
document an important role for primary surpluses in the US after WWII even
though most of the debt was reduced by steady positive GDP growth rates.
They also find a non-negligible role of negative real interest rates due to realized
inflation (see also Sims, 2013). Leeper and Zhou (2013) formalize the idea that
revaluations of nominal debt through inflation can be a part of optimal monetary
and fiscal policies when the average maturity of government debt is high. As
growth is not a direct policy option (at least in the short term), and inflation
might entail tremendous costs (Barro and Gordon, 1983), I focus on changes in
primary surpluses.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section introduces the
model in detail. Section 1.3 shows the long-run implications of different debt
ratios while section 1.4 describes the transition through means of fiscal adjust-
ments. This is followed by a section on two extensions (consolidation at the ELB
and a medium-scale DSGE model) while section 1.6 concludes this paper.
1.2 Model set up
The model is a stylized closed economy New Keynesian model with fiscal rules
and the extension of long-term bonds as in Krause and Moyen (2016). The
economy consists of three agents: households, which maximize their life time
utility; firms, that maximize profits and a government authority that sets fiscal
policy in order to keep the actual debt level close to a target rate. The household
8Another interaction focuses on how the anticipation of a future debt reduction plan affects
the current stimulus during a severe crisis; for instance, see Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Mu¨ller
(2010) for a case of government spending.
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derives utility from consumption of private and public goods and from leisure.
The asset market trades one period and long-term bonds. All households supply
their labor services in a competitive labor market. On the production side there
are two types of firms. The monopolistic competitive firms hire labor to produce
intermediate goods and sell the goods to the final-good firm. They face nominal
rigidities a` la Calvo (1983) when setting their optimal price. The final-good
firm uses the intermediate goods in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
production function to produce an aggregate good a` la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
which is sold to the households in a perfectly competitive market. The monetary
authority follows a Taylor rule that reacts on inflation and output.
1.2.1 Long-term bonds
To better account for changes in the real interest rate of government bonds, I
model an extended maturity structure for long-term bonds, following Krause and
Moyen (2016). Each unit of such debt is denoted by BL,nt , where the L stands for
long-term and the n for newly-issued debt at time t. Every period, the holder of
BL,nt receives an interest payment of i
L,n
t (fixed rate). If the bond matures, which
happens stochastically every period with probability γ, the bond pays back the
principal of 1. As there is implicitly a unit-mass of BL,nt , by the law of large
numbers, a fraction γ actually matures each period. Then, the average maturity
is given by 1
γ
. However, it is important to note that γ not only determines the
average maturity but also the amount of bonds maturing every period. In case
of the US in 2018, this seems to be a valid approximation, see figure 1.2 below.
Given that a certain fraction of bonds matures every period, the stock of long-
term debt BLt (without n) evolves as
BLt = (1− γ)BLt−1 +BL,nt (1.1)
One central object of the paper is the nominal debt-servicing cost (or interest
expenses) of the government iLt B
L
t . It is obtained recursively by the sum of the
average interest rate expenses of the past (weighted by the amount that did not
mature) and on the newly issued bonds:
iLt B
L
t = (1− γ)iLt−1BLt−1 + iL,nt BL,nt (1.2)
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Figure 1.2: Fraction of debt maturing within next 10 years
 Notes: The dashed line depicts the amount of debt in the US as of June 2017 that matures in
years 2017 to 2026. The solid line is the corresponding fraction implied by the model.
Sources: US Treasury, Fiscal Year 2019 Q2 Report.
It follows that the average debt-servicing cost of the government on its outstand-
ing debt is a weighted sum of previous debt-servicing costs, which can be seen
by iterating equation (1.2):
iLt B
L
t = i
L,n
t B
L,n
t + (1− γ)iL,nt−1BL,nt−1 + (1− γ)2iL,nt−2BL,nt−2 + . . . . (1.3)
Similarly, the nominal average interest rate iLt is a weighted sum of long-term
interest rates of newly issued bonds (iL,nt ), weighted by the relative fraction of
those bonds that did not yet mature:
iLt = i
L,n
t
BL,nt
BLt
+ iL,nt−1(1− γ)
BL,nt−1
BLt
+ iL,nt−2(1− γ)2
BL,nt−2
BLt
+ . . . (1.4)
This recursive formulation makes transparent that average interest rate dynamics
of government debt are largely pre-determined in this setup and that the interest
rate on newly issued government debt (denoted by iL,nt ) is only of minor impor-
tance. This is an important feature that is shared by the data. For instance,
during the height of the Greek financial crisis in 2012, 10y interest rates spiked
to around 30%, i.e. iL,n2012 = 30%. However, the average interest rate was only
around 4.3%, i.e. iL2012 = 4.3%. See, for instance, Deutsche Bundesbank (2017).
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1.2.2 Households
Households can purchase private consumption PtCt or invest in short- and long-
term bonds, Bt and B
L,n
t , respectively.
9 They earn after-tax wage income (1 −
τt)PtWtNt, the returns from the short-term bonds (1 + it−1)Bt−1, returns from
long-term bonds (γ+iLt−1)B
L
t−1 and dividends from firm ownerships PtDt. Denote
with λt the Lagrange multiplier attached to the budget constraint and with µt
the multiplier on the dynamics of government debt-servicing costs (equation (1.2)
and (1.1)).10 The representative household maximizes its life time utility:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
C1−σ
1− σ + χg
G1−σg
1− σg − χn
N1+φ
1 + φ
}
subject to the budget constraint
PtCt +Bt +B
L,n
t ≤ (1− τt)PtWtNt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (γ + iLt−1)BLt−1 + PtDt
and government interest rate dynamics
iLt B
L
t = (1− γ)iLt−1BLt−1 + iL,nt
(
BLt − (1− γ)BLt−1
)
(1.2)
Note that the interest rate on newly issued long-term debt iL,nt is taken as given,
similar to the short-term policy rate. However, the average rate iLt depends on
the composition of newly issued and outstanding bonds and is chosen indirectly
by the household. Therefore, the household must take this into account when
maximizing his welfare.
The first order conditions for the short-term bond holdings yield the familiar
Euler equation:
C−σt = βEt
{
1 + it
1 + pit+1
C−σt+1
}
(1.5)
where pit =
Pt
Pt−1
− 1 is the net inflation rate. The optimality condition for long-
term bonds is
9As shown below, short-term debt will be set to zero net supply (see below), but it is needed
to derive the Euler equation.
10To arrive at the expression one has to scale µt by
λt
Pt
.
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1 = βEt
{
C−σt+1
C−σt
1
1 + pit+1
[
1 + iL,nt − µt+1(1− γ)
(
iL,nt+1 − iL,nt
)]}
(1.6)
while µt evolves according to
µt = βEt
{
C−σt+1
C−σt
1
1 + pit+1
(1 + (1− γ)µt+1)
}
. (1.7)
The first equation is the standard Euler equation, but the last two deserve a
bit more attention. First, note that (1.7) in steady state results in µ = 1
i+γ
.
This reduces to the pricing function for a one-period bond if γ = 1 and also a
consol if γ = 0. Since µt is the Lagrange multiplier on (1.2) one can interpret
it as the price of the long-term bond. As can be seen from equation (1.7) the
price is higher than for short-term debt. In case of γ = 1 equation (1.6) implies
iL,nt = it and the second Euler equation collapses to the first one. The two Euler
equations (1.5) and (1.6) constitute the no arbitrage condition for investing at
different horizons. The right hand sight of (1.6) is the expected payoff of a long-
term debt valued by the stochastic discount factor. It consists of two parts, the
first, 1 + iL,nt is the return if the bond would mature next period. The second,
−µt+1(1− γ)(iL,nt+1− iL,nt ), can be interpreted as the capital loss (gain) that arises
from a rise (fall) in the newly issued long-term rate. The no arbitrage condition
implies that once the household expects a rise of newly-issued long-term interest
rates, i.e. iL,nt+1 > i
L,n
t , he asks for a premium to compensate the investment
as it ties resources for several periods. It is optimal to take into account the
direct return plus the opportunity costs of having resources fixed in a long-term
contract. The remaining FOC yields the labor supply
Wt(1− τt) = χnNφt Cσt . (1.8)
1.2.3 Firms
The final good firm uses intermediate goods from the monopolistic competitive
firm and produces a final good with a CES production function. Its demand for
each intermediate good j is given by
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
ydt
13
where ydt is the household demand for a final good.
Each intermediate good firm produces its good yt(j) according to yt(j) = AtNt(j)
where Nt(j) is the amount of labor and At aggregate technology. As the produc-
tion function exhibits constant returns to scale, marginal costs are independent
of the level of production and equal to
mct =
Wt
At
(1.9)
Each firm sets a profit maximizing price subject to Calvo (1983) nominal frictions.
The FOC of the firm can be cast into the following recursive forms:
g1t = λtmcty
d
t + βθEt
{
g1t+1
}
(1.10)
g2t = λty
d
t + βθEt
{
g2t+1
}
. (1.11)
The optimal price is equal to
P ∗t
Pt
=

− 1
g1t
g2t
(1.12)
and the price index evolves according to
1 = θ(1 + pit)
−1 + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
. (1.13)
1.2.4 Government
Fiscal policy is captured by simple feedback rules that increase (decrease) the tax
rate (government spending) if the actual debt-to-GDP ratio is above some target
ratio d¯t. The latter will be reduced exogenously to a lower value d¯
new < d¯old.
Furthermore, it seems plausible that policymakers plan to reduce the target ratio
gradually to avoid potentially large adverse consequences on output. To capture
this gradualism I follow Coenen et al. (2008) and use the following law of motion:
d¯t = (1− ρd)d¯new + ρbd¯t−1 (1.14)
where ρd is chosen such that the debt target converges to its new level of d¯new =
90% after approximately 10 years.11 The government budget constraint is given
11A linear specification or an AR(2) as in (Erceg and Linde´, 2013) did not change the results
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by
Bt +B
L,n
t + PtτtWtNt = PtGt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 + (γ + i
L
t−1)B
L
t−1. (1.15)
Taking equation (1.1) into account, this simplifies to
BLt + PtτtWtNt = PtGt + (1 + i
L
t−1)B
L
t−1. (1.16)
The government finances its public expenditures Gt and interest payments with
tax revenues or the issuance of new debt. Fiscal rules will react on the difference
between the debt ratio and its respective target d¯t. The debt-to-GDP ratio in
the model is given by
dt =
BLt +Bt
Yt
(1.17)
Tax-based consolidation
If consolidation is achieved by means of higher labor tax rates, the fiscal feedback
rule is given by
τt − τnew = φτ︸︷︷︸
>0
(dt − d¯t). (1.18a)
Note that the fiscal rule is in deviation from the new steady state tax rate τnew
that is consistent with the new, lower debt level d¯new. The parameter φτ cap-
tures the pace of adjustment. The larger its value, the stronger taxes react on
deviations from the target. As will be explained in detail in the next section,
the new steady state implies a different optimal amount of public expenditures.12
Therefore, I have to make an additional assumption on how government spending
will move towards its new steady state value.13 I chose a similar law of motion
below qualitatively.
12This enhances transparency with respect to the instruments used, as the initial and the
end steady state are similar.
13To sharpen the intuition, I will only focus on polar cases, i.e. only tax-based adjustments or
spending-based ones.Some studies that evaluate a mixed-strategy also assume that the compo-
sition of the budgetary adjustment affects the new long-term steady state. For example, Erceg
and Linde´ (2013) show an “intertemporal trade-off between tax-based and expenditure-based
consolidation: the former induces a smaller near-term output contraction, but implies a consid-
erably deeper output decline at longer horizons.” Therefore a mixed-strategy seems reasonable
to evaluate. However, as my long-term steady state does not depend on the composition (see
the next section below), there is no such reasoning a priori.
15
as for the evolution of the debt ratio target, namely:
Gt = (1− ρg)Gnew + ρgGt−1, (1.19a)
where ρg is chosen such that Gt converges after 40 quarters to G
new.14
Expenditure-based consolidation
If the budgetary adjustment is achieved through a reduction in government ex-
penditures, the spending path evolves according to
Gt −Gnew = φg︸︷︷︸
<0
(dt − d¯t). (1.18b)
Tax rates will evolve towards their new steady state value by
τt = (1− ρτ )τnew + ρττt−1. (1.19b)
Monetary policy
Monetary policy is set according to a Taylor-rule that reacts on the inflation rate
and output:
1 + it
1 + i
=
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
)φpi (Yt
Y
)φy
(1.20)
1.2.5 Aggregation and exogenous rules
Finally, the goods market must clear such that
Yt∆t = AtNt (1.21)
with
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−
di
14I provide robustness results for different transitional specifications of exogenous transition
(linear, front loading or back-loading adjustments) and whether all the free resources of lower
debt ratios are used to lower taxes / increase spending. Overall the results are robust to all
such changes.
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and by the Calvo-property
∆t = θ∆t−1(1 + pit) + (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
. (1.22)
The aggregate resource constraint is
Yt = Ct +Gt. (1.23)
Equations (1.1) to (1.23) describe the non-linear model economy. To analyze the
transition towards the new steady state I use perfect foresight (for details, see
the appendix).
1.2.6 Calibration
I calibrate the model to match the debt characteristics of the US economy in
2018. For simplicity, I set the amount of short-term debt Bt ≡ 0 for all t and
thus abstract from any portfolio decision taken by the government.15 The model
starts with an initial debt-to-GDP level of 100% and converges to a new debt
target of d¯new = 90%. γ is equal to 0.055 to match the average maturity of US
debt in 2018 of 68 months.
The time preference rate β is chosen to match an average annual real return of
4%. The inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of private and public goods
σ, σg as well as the inverse Frisch elasticity
1
φ
are all set to 1. The economy is
subject to a steady state mark up of 20% and an average adjustment of nominal
prices that will take one year, so  = 6 and θ = 0.75. The policy parameters for
the Taylor rule are standard values that satisfy the Taylor principle with φpi = 1.5
and φy = 0.125. The adjustment parameters on the fiscal feedback rules were
chosen such that the actual debt level will be reduced by 10%−points within 40
quarters.
As emphasized above, γ also captures the average amount of debt that matures
within one quarter. Figure 1.2 depicts how well that calibration fits the US data.
I set government spending equal to 20% of GDP, roughly the average of post
15Krause and Moyen (2016) set the real level of debt BtPt = bt = b to a constant. However,
as there is no steady state inflation in my specification both specifications yield similar results.
A complementary approach would be to choose a constant proportion of short- relative to
long-term bonds.
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WWII levels. The weighting parameters on labor and government spending are
chosen such that with a debt ratio of 100% it would be optimal to spend 20% of
GDP on public goods and to work N = 1
3
hours (see below).16
1.3 Long run implications
Before analyzing transitional paths one has to decide how to allocate the free
resources as a result of the lower debt-to-GDP ratio and therefore lower interest
expenses. In general, one can either increase public consumption, reduce the
tax rate or a combination of both. I will determine the optimal composition of
tax rates, government expenditure and private consumption that maximizes the
households welfare for a given (lower) debt level, following Adam (2011).17 I thus
assume that, for reasons outside of the model, the government decides not only
to reduce debt levels but also to converge to a new steady state in which this
debt level implies an optimal allocation of the other aggregate variables. The
remaining task is then to assess which instrument to use in order to transit from
the same steady state A to the same steady state B.18
Table 1.2 shows the results of different steady state debt-to-GDP ratios (100%,
90% and 80%) for private and public consumption, hours worked and the tax rate
(for details on the setup, see the appendix). The percentage change is relative
to the initial debt level of 100% except for tax rates where the percentage point
change is used.
The additional funds from lower debt repayments are used to reduce distor-
tionary tax rates and to increase public good provision. As a result of both, the
households will decide to work more: First, lower tax rates increase the incentive
16For a robustness of some of the parameters see the conclusion. The qualitative results are
basically unchanged.
17The approach usually taken in the literature is that all free resources are used for the
instrument that was used in the consolidation process (see, for instance, Coenen et al., 2008;
Forni, Gerali and Pisani, 2010; Glomm, Jung and Tran, 2018). That is if government spending
(the tax rate) was reduced (increased) during the transition, then all the proceeds would be
used to increase government spending (reduce tax rates) in the long-run. This will have a
feedback effect on the household behavior, which blurs whether the overall results are driven
by different fiscal measures during the transition or different steady states.
18A potential drawback is that a path for the other instrument that is not used within
the consolidation phase has to be specified. However, the results do not depend on specific
functional forms of the other instrument. I also checked the approach taken by the literature
and again found no big difference. Hence, it seems that in the model short-term adjustments
are driving the results.
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Table 1.2: Steady state comparison for different debt levels
C H G τ CV
100% debt-to-GDP 0.27 0.33 0.07 0.29
(starting point)
90% debt-to-GDP 0.27 0.33 0.67 0.28
0.27% 0.33% 0.57% -0.43pp 0.18%
80% debt-to-GDP 0.27 0.34 0.07 0.28
0.54% 0.65% 1.10% -0.86pp 0.36%
Notes: C denotes private consumption, H hours worked, G the provision of public goods, τ
the tax rate and CV, the welfare equivalent consumption variation given by equation (1.24).
to work by reducing the intratemporal labor-leisure distortions. Second, the in-
crease in permanent government consumption constitutes c.p. a negative wealth
effect that induces the agent to work more (Coenen et al., 2008). Due to lower
distortionary tax rates, private consumption is crowded in my setting. The table
also reports the welfare equivalent consumption variation (CV) that is required
every period to make the household in the initial steady state as well off as in
the new one. More precisely, denote by V (· · · ) life time utility, that is
V
(
(1 + ζ)Cold, N old, Gold
)
=
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
(1 + ζ)Cold, N old, Gold
)
It follows that
U
(
(1 + ζ)Cold, N old, Gold
) ≡ U(Cnew, Nnew, Gnew) (1.24)
ζ > 0 implies that the household asks for a compensation to be indifferent
between both states, that is, it prefers the new state. With a 10pp reduction in
the debt ratio, households demand 0.18% of permanent consumption if debt is
high to be indifferent – hence, lower debt ratios are welfare enhancing. With a 20
percentage points reduction the CV doubles to 0.36% and one can show that the
linear relation persists, at least for reasonable ranges.19 The qualitative result is
robust to different CRRA-parameters in the utility function for private or public
consumption and for different mark-ups and Frisch elasticities.
19In this economy, the first best would be -943% debt-to-GDP, which would raise consump-
tion by 28.7%, hours worked by 31.1%, government spending by 40.6% and reduce the tax rate
by 48.9pp (i.e. a subsidy).
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Figure 1.3: Tax-based consolidation
 
  
Notes: All variables are in percentage deviation from steady state, except tax rates, inflation
and interest rates which are in percentage point deviations.
1.4 Transition dynamics
While the previous section has focused on potential welfare gains from lower
debt levels in the long-run, this section sheds some light on potential costs dur-
ing the consolidation period and whether an equilibrium with lower debt levels
is preferable relative to the status quo if the transitional adjustments are taken
into account. A permanent reduction of the debt target b¯t from 100% to 90% is
simulated according to equation (1.14). This will induce fiscal policy to adjust
accordingly which affects the economy at large. I will first present each consol-
idation separately, compare them, show that the results hold in medium-scale
DSGE model as well, and then contrast it with a maturity-structure of only one
period debt.
1.4.1 Fiscal consolidation
Figure 1.3 shows the aggregate effects for a tax-based consolidation. The fall
in the debt target (upper left panel) induces the labor tax rate to rise until
period 6 and then to gradually convert back to its new (lower) value τnew (upper
20
middle panel). Higher distortionary taxes reduce the incentive to supply labor
which cause a recession (lower left panel). Additionally government spending will
be higher in the new long run equilibrium (lower middle panel).20 The output
drop is quite pronounced and lasts for 5 to 6 years until labor supply recovers
and converges to its higher long-term equilibrium. As taxes reduce the after-
tax wage income, households ask for higher pre-tax wages to compensate part
of the income loss. Since wages are marginal costs for firms they react to that
by charging a higher prices which leads to inflation (upper right panel). The
monetary authority follows the Taylor principle and raises its policy rate more
than one-to-one, driving up the real short-term interest rates.
As can be seen from equation (1.4), the average interest rate ilt is a weighted sum
of its previous value ilt−1 and the new interest rate i
l,n
t . Additionally, i
l,n
t depends
on the expected future path of the policy rate it if one iterates (1.6) forward. Since
the model is solved under perfect foresight, agents take into account the complete
path of future policy rates, not only the initial spike. Therefore, the interest rate
on newly issued long-term debt il,nt increases by a mere 0.4% but much less
pronounced compared to the policy rate hikes of 2.5% (lower right panel). Since
nominal average interest rate react less than one-to-one with inflation, the real
average rate decline.21
Now contrast this scenario with an expenditure-based consolidation, depicted in
figure 1.4 for the same variables. Public good provision will be reduced up to
18% and recovers gradually until it reaches its higher long run level Gnew (lower
left panel). The reduction in spending forces the economy into a recession with
lower inflation (upper middle and right panel).22 Monetary policy responds by
cutting the short-term interest rate, but the reduction in the nominal average
interest rate iLt is muted (lower right panel) so that real ones rise.
23
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Figure 1.4: Spending-based consolidation
 
Notes: All variables are in percentage deviation from steady state, except tax rates, inflation
and interest rates which are in percentage point deviations.
1.4.2 Comparing both fiscal consolidations
In the above simulations it is assumed that both consolidation strategies lead
to the same long run equilibrium, but they entail different adjustment costs
during the transition. While one can in principle assess the aggregate dynamics
from figures 1.3 and 1.4, it is instructive to aggregate these effects into one
number that is easily comparable. I use two metrics to compare the relative
desirability/associated costs.
20The increase in government spending constitutes a negative wealth effect and lowers private
consumption while increasing the supply of labor. This effect lowers generally the negative
effect of tax-hikes on output.
21After a while inflation is below the average long-term rate thus increasing real rates of the
outstanding debt stock. However, as the total stock is already reduced by that time, this effect
is rather smaller.
22The simultaneous reduction of the tax rate is helpful to partly cushion the drop in GDP.
The importance of future composition of variables on current dynamics is shown, for instance,
by (Cogan et al., 2013).
23The initial jump of inflation, output and the policy rate can be explained by an anticipation
effect: Since households foresee that government spending will be lower during in the future,
there is a positive wealth effect which raises private demand. However, in the first periods,
public spending is not yet reduced as much, so the overall effect is expansionary. If spending
would be cut more forcefully (increase φg), there is always a recession and deflation.
22
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Figure 1.5: Fiscal Sacrifice Ratio
Notes: Fiscal Sacrifice Ratio is calculated as in (1.25).
The first is the “Fiscal Sacrifice Ratio” (FSR), a measure, that relates the output
loss to the percentage point reduction of debt. For a smoother comparison I
use the average output drop rather the exact drop within that period. More
precisely, the ratio is defined as
ξT =
1
T
∑T
t=1
Yt−Y old
Y old
dT − dold (1.25)
Figure 1.5 presents the ratio at a two, three and four year horizon. Within two
years, both fiscal consolidations reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio by about 3.5%
points while output falls on average about 1%, consistent with a FSR of around
1/3. Increasing the time horizon reduces the sacrifice ratio as output growth
increases.24 Over the whole time span tax-based consolidation is associated with
a slightly lower FSR than a spending-based one.
A second approach is to evaluate the welfare equivalent consumption variation
(CV) associated with each reduction scenario, that is the permanent amount
of consumption that makes the household indifferent between remaining at the
status quo (steady state with high debt) and moving to a lower debt world. It is
defined as
V
(
(1 + ζ)Cold, N old, Gold
) ≡ ∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct, Nt, Gt) . (1.26)
ζ > 0 implies that consolidation is actually welfare enhancing. On the other
side, if ζ < 0 the status quo would be preferable. The corresponding CVs
24In the first year, both sacrifice ratios are negative.
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Figure 1.6: Tax-based consolidation with short-term debt
 
  Notes: All variables are in percentage deviation from steady state, except tax rates, inflation
and interest rates which are in percentage point deviations. The lower right panel displays
the variable iLt which coincides with the policy rate in the case of short-term debt.
are −0.06 for spending-based and 0.04 for the tax-based budgetary adjustment.
Thus, similar to the assessment based on the FSR, tax-based adjustments are
preferable relative to spending-based ones since its CV is higher. On top, the
results also imply that households actually want to consolidate when it is done
by raising taxes since their life time utility is higher in that case. With spending-
cuts, the transitional costs are too high such that it would be welfare detrimental.
The next subsection illustrates, how much these results depend on the average
maturity of public debt and the dynamics of the real average interest rates.
1.4.3 Short-term public debt
As emphasized in the introduction, it is important to properly capture the dy-
namics of the real average interest rate, since it has a first order effect on the
debt-to-GDP ratio. To gauge the extent to which different maturities of public
debt affect the interest rate, I conduct two experiments: First, I evaluate the
aggregate responses for both fiscal adjustments when only short-term debt is
available and second, contrast the FSR and the CV for intermediate values of
maturity.
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Figure 1.7: Spending-based consolidation with short-term debt
 
 Notes: All variables are in percentage deviation from steady state, except tax rates, inflation
and interest rates which are in percentage point deviations. The lower right panel displays
the variable iLt which coincides with the policy rate in the case of short-term debt.
With short-term debt the dynamics of the real average interest rates correspond
to the real short-term rates, with accompanying effects on public debt. Figures
1.6 and 1.7 depict the comparison of the same macroeconomic variables as above
when public debt is short-term (dashed lines) and long-term (figures above, solid
lines). Qualitatively, the aggregate responses are similar for both cases. The
increase in the tax rate raises inflation and the nominal average interest rates
and lowers GDP. Spending-cuts lower the inflation rate, the nominal interest rate
and also depress output. However, for the tax-based scenario the quantitative
results differ markedly.
The labor tax rate roughly doubles to 5% points (upper middle panel) which
leads to an output drop of more than 3% that is also more persistent (lower left
panel). In the first periods inflation actually falls (upper right panel) since the
reduction in demand outweighs the increase in marginal costs. It is only after
that initial period that the inflation rate is positive. Nevertheless, in the first
period real average interest rates are reduced due to the Taylor-principle (lower
right panel, similar as above), while higher inflation raises real rates afterwards.
This also implies that taxes rise relatively more compared to the long-term debt
benchmark. As a result, the recession is deeper. In the spending-based adjust-
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Figure 1.8: Fiscal Sacrifice Ratio and CV evaluated at different maturities for
tax- and spending-based consolidation
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ments, public goods still have to be cut by roughly 18% but recover much faster
(lower middle panel). This lowers the real average interest rate which is beneficial
for the government budget (in contrast to the TB-plan), which allows spending
to increase relatively faster. Output follows that pattern quite closely (lower left
panel). Compared to the tax-based consolidation, the aggregate variables do not
move that much.
A comparison of both measures reveals that spending-based consolidation is now
preferable. The sacrifice ratio is between 3 to 5 times smaller and the CV larger
(-0.01 vs -0.13 with TB-plans). Nevertheless, as the negative value indicates,
from a welfare point of view maintaining the status quo is desirable. Hence, with
short-term debt the model replicates findings that EB-plans are more preferable
than TB-ones.
To contrast intermediate cases and to quantify until which extended maturity
TB-plans become superior, I simulate the model for a range of average maturities
from one-period debt to 14 years and compare the FSR and CV at each maturity
in time.25 The results are depicted in figure 1.8.
Focus on the FSR in the left panel first. It illustrates how distortionary tax-based
budgetary adjustments can be when debt is only short-term. If the horizon is
extended, the distortion falls relatively quickly. Overall, the maturity does not
affect the FSR much in case of expenditure-based consolidation, in line with the
aggregate results in the one-period debt model. The right panel shows the CV,
25I focus on the 2-year horizon for the FSR.
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which marks a more continuous picture: It monotonically increases (decreases)
with the average maturity of debt when consolidation is tax-(spending-)based.
The threshold after which tax-based consolidation is preferable is about 2 years
for the CV and 4 years for the FSR. Additionally, for maturities above 3 years
households are actually better off with a tax-based debt consolidation (positive
CV).
1.5 Robustness
The main message in this paper is that the maturity structure of government
debt can shape the aggregate dynamics of fiscal consolidation due to its induced
impact on interest rates. In this section I briefly comment on some robustness
checks.
The results do not change qualitatively a lot if I assume different timing assump-
tions on how debt is reduced and the feedback rules are set-up. Also, even though
the size of consolidation reduces the overall magnitude, it does not change the
relative result that TB-plans become more preferable when public debt is long-
term.
I have also simulated the model with different parameter values. Broadly speak-
ing the main result did not change although quantitatively some changes strengthen
and other weaken the interest rate channel relative to the benchmark calibration.
As an example, a lower Frisch elasticity renders tax-based consolidation less infla-
tionary (muted wage response), lowering the response of the real average interest
rate. This is also the case for spending-cuts, but less so. Hence, the distance
between the two CV measures narrows.
1.5.1 Consolidation at the ELB
One conjecture (also raised in the literature mentioned above) is that tax-based
adjustments should become more favorable when monetary policy is constrained
by an effective lower bound (ELB). To quantify whether this is the case, I first
simulate a negative demand shock that brings the economy to the ELB for 4
quarters.26 Then, I contrast tax-based vs. spending-based consolidation. Figure
26To conduct this exercise I log-linearize the model around the steady state and follow the
approach by Kulish and Pagan (2017), see the appendix for further details of the implementa-
tion.
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Figure 1.9: Fiscal consolidation at the effective lower bound.
 
  
1.9 illustrates the response relative to the baseline ELB experiment, i.e. values
above (below) 0 indicate that the relative response is higher (lower) than in the
baseline with no extra consolidation.
Focus on the EB-plan first (red line). In order to reduce the debt ratio (above
what is already implied by the recession), spending has to be cut even further
(upper middle panel), which lowers GDP (bottom left panel) and inflation (upper
right panel). The real average interest rate increases (bottom middle panel) quite
strongly. The reason is that the short-term policy rate is stuck at the ELB which
cannot accommodate the demand shortage. Therefore, nominal average interest
rates react less than one-to-one for two reasons. First, as above, only part of the
debt is reissued and the long-term interest rate on newly issued debt depends
on todays and expected future short rates. Second, since the short-rate in the
next 4 quarters is bound by the ELB, the interest rate on newly issued debt is
relatively higher. This prolongs the recession.
In case of a tax-based consolidation (blue line), higher labor taxes increase in-
flation (falls relatively less pronounced than in baseline) and the real average
interest rate falls as well. As a result, a small boom occurs in the first three
quarters (bottom right panel) - a case of expansionary austerity. The reason is
that the additional inflation expectations reduce short-term and long-term real
rates which raise demand. This initial expansionary impact also raises short-
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Figure 1.10: Comparison of tax-based (TB) and epxenditure-based (EB) consol-
idation in the medium-scale DSGE model
 
Notes: The medium-scale DSGE model is a version of Carlstrom et al. (2017). See appendix
for further details.
term rates such that the ELB is already left before the baseline of 4 quarters.
However, once the tax rates keep on rising, the expansionary impact vanishes.
1.5.2 Medium-scale DSGE
So far, I have been using a stylized model for the simulations. To ensure that the
qualitative results are not driven by the specific kind of model, I use a medium-
scale DSGE model to run similar simulations. In particular, I use the model by
Carlstrom et al. (2017) – it is an estimated model for the US economy that already
includes long-term debt – and augment it with a fiscal sector (see the appendix
for details). The results indicate that a permanent reduction of the debt-to-GDP
target (upper left panel) has qualitatively similar effects to the stylized model.
With tax-based consolidation, inflation and the short-term policy rate increase
(bottom left and middle panel) while the real long rate decreases (bottom right
panel). The opposite is true for spending-cuts. Hence, the general mechanism
emphasized above holds also in more complex model environments.
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1.5.3 Further sensitivity
It is straightforward to extend the model to a situation in which after consolida-
tion begins, the government is only able to issue short-term debt. The motivation
behind such a scenario is that after a crisis (like the Great Recession) investors
might be weary to hold new long-term debt, especially in countries that have
to consolidate. As a simplification, I assume that with the beginning of a bud-
getary adjustment, the government can only issue short-term debt. In this case,
the interest rate of newly issued bonds and the short-term policy rate coincide,
i.e. iL,nt = it. Nevertheless, the results are pretty much unchanged (illustrated in
figure 1.11 in the appendix).
A question remains how much of the results are driven by the underlying simple
rules relative to some optimal policies. Even though in many applications, simple
rules can approximate Ramsey policy (Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2007), it is not
clear in this setup. An interesting extension would be an open economy setup.
This should have two countervailing effects: On the one hand, the attenuated
response of monetary policy in such a union should strengthen the case for tax-
based consolidation (as explained above with the ELB scenario). On the other
hand, higher prices reduce the real exchange rate and lower competitiveness
which dampens output. A proper analysis of how these extensions might affect
the results is left for future research.
To keep the model as simple as possible the average maturity in the data is
approximated by having just one bond with the exact average maturity. This
seems to be a reasonably well characterization for the US. However, the shape of
the CV (concave and convex) in figure 1.8 implies that an even richer maturity
structure might affect especially welfare results.27
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I assess the macroeconomic implications of expenditure-based (EB)
versus tax-based (TB) consolidation through the lens of a New Keynesian model
27Suppose, for example, the average maturity is 10Q with 50% short-term and 50% 19Q
debt. This implies a CV of -0.04 for spending-cuts and roughly 0 for tax-hikes (see figure
1.8). However, the respective number for 50%*one-period debt+50%*19Q debt would imply
for tax-hikes a lower and for spending-cuts a larger number, thus closing the distance between
both consolidations.
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with long-term debt. As it turns out, keeping track of the real average interest
rate dynamics is important to determine the relative desirability of the two fiscal
adjustments.
The main result of the paper is that an extended maturity of public debt can
render tax-hikes superior to spending-cuts. If government bonds are short-term,
the opposite holds. The reason is that the real average interest rate – the interest
rate that the government pays on its outstanding liabilities and which affects the
debt-to-GDP ratio next to growth and surplus – moves in opposite direction
with the inflation rate, if the maturity is long enough. When consolidation is
tax-based, the resulting higher inflation reduces the real interest rate which is
beneficial for the government budget. On the other hand, lower inflation following
EB-plans raise real rates, making consolidation harder. The results hold in a
medium-scale DSGE model as well.
The present analyses is stylized. It should not be interpreted as a policy ad-
vice to always reduce the debt ratio through TB-consolidation. For instance,
empirically, in many consolidations the government aims to cut rather wasteful
expenditures or transfers, which I did not consider. The paper rather clarifies
the important role of the interaction between real average interest rates dynamics
and the composition of fiscal consolidation.
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Appendices
1.A Overview model equations stylized model
1.A.1 Households
λt = C
−σ
t (27)
Wt(1− τt) = χnNφt Cσt (28)
1 = βEt
λt+1
λt
1 + it
1 + pit
(29)
1 = βEt
λt+1
λt
1 + it
1 + pit
(
1 + iL,nt − µt+1(1− γ)(iL,nt+1 − iL,nt )
)
(30)
bLt =
(1− γ)
1 + pit
bLt−1 + b
L,n
t (31)
iLt b
L
t =
(1− γ)
1 + pit
iLt−1b
L
t−1 + i
L,n
t b
L,n
t (32)
1.A.2 Firms
Wt = MCt(1− α)AtN−αt (33)
g1t = λtMCtYt + βθEt
(
1 + pit+1
1 + pi
)
g1t+1 (34)
g2t = λtYt + βθEt
(
1 + pit+1
1 + pi
)−1
g2t+1 (35)
p∗ =

− 1
g1
g2
(36)
1 = θ
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
)−1
+ (1− θ) (p∗)1− (37)
∆ = θ∆t−1
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
) 
1−α
+ (1− θ) (p∗)− 1−α (38)
1.A.3 Government
bL,nt + τtWtNt = Gt +
γ + iLt−1
1 + pi
bLt−1 (39)
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Fiscal rules, either:
τt − τnew = φτ
(
BLt
4Y new
− dnew
)
(40)
Gt = (1− ρg)Gnew + ρgGt−1 (41)
or
Gt −Gnew = φg
(
BLt
4Y new
− dnew
)
(42)
τt = (1− ρτ )τnew + ρττt−1 (43)
1.A.4 Monetary Policy
1 + it = (1 + i)
(
1 + pit
1 + pi
)φpi ( Yt
Y new
)φy
(44)
1.A.5 Exogenous rules
At = (At−1)ρaeε
a
t (45)
d¯t = (1− ρd)d¯new + ρbd¯t−1 (46)
1.A.6 Aggregation
Yt∆
1−α = AtN1−αt (47)
Yt = Ct +Gt (48)
1.B Model solution
In a nutshell, the algorithm finds numerical values of the variables that solve the
non-linear equations. The important assumption one has to impose is that the
model returns to equilibrium in finite time instead of asymptotically. Taking the
labor supply (1.8) as an example one rewrites
Wt(1− τt) = χnNφt Cσt ⇔ Wt(1− τt)− χnNφt Cσt = 0
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Proceeding for equations (1.1) to (1.23) one can cast the model in time t into
f(Xt+1, Xt, Xt−1) = f(zt) = 0
with Xt = {Wt, τt, Nt, Yt . . . } denoting all model variables at time t and zt =
[Xt+1, Xt, Xt−1] collecting forward and backward-looking terms. One has to
choose, first, a starting point X0 = X
old, e.g. the initial steady state with
high debt, second, an ending point XT+1 = X
new, the new steady state with
lower debt and finally the number of periods to simulate, e.g. 2000 periods. The
algorithm than stacks for t = 1, 2, ..., 2000 all the equations into one big system
F (Z) = 0, Z = [z1 z2 . . . zT ], i.e. a system of 23*2000 equations, and solves for
the root.28
1.C Long run optimization
To get the optimal allocation of variables for a given debt amount I set up a
Lagrangian that maximizes the households welfare function given the constraints
1.5, 1.6, 1.8, 1.15, 1.21 and 1.23. As this is a long-run perspective only the last
four equations bind. One can show that it boils down to the following Lagrangian:
L
(
N, τ,G; γ1, γ2
)
= u(N −G)− v(N) + g(G)+
γ1
[
MC(1− τ)− χnNφ(N −G)σc
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
labor−leisure
+γ2
[
MCτN −G− i4Nd¯new]︸ ︷︷ ︸
gov. budget constraint
Maximization leads to 4 equations and 4 unknowns (N, τ,G, γ2) that can only be
solved numerically (using the matlab routine fsolve.m). Specifically, the first
order conditions are given by:
(N −G)−σc − χnNφ − λχn
(
φNφ(N −G)σc + σcNφ+1(N −G)σc−1
)
+
λ
(
τmc− 1 + i
1 + pi
dnew4
)
= 0 (49)
28This algorithm is implemented in Dynare http://www.dynare.org/.
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− (N −G)−σc + χgG−σg + λ
(
σcχnN
1+φ(N −G)σc−1 − 1) = 0 (50)
mc(1− τ)− χnNφ(N −G)σc = 0 (51)
τmcN −G− 1 + i
1 + pi
4Ndnew = 0 (52)
1.D Robustness appendix
1.D.1 Consolidate with short-term debt
 
  
Figure 1.11: Fiscal consolidation when governments can only issue short-term
debt, but the initial liabilities are long-term.
This section briefly comments on the scenario, where the government can only
issue short-term debt after it begins to raise taxes or decrease spending. The
average maturity from past liabilities is, however, set to the US-average. Figure
1.11 depicts the difference between this scenario and the baseline with long-term
debt (i.e. figures 1.3 and 1.4). As can be seen in the bottom right panel, the
nominal average interest rate indeed reacts stronger, but this does not change the
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aggregate responses much. The reason is that the average interest rate reacts
only sluggishly since for most liabilities, the interest rates are pre-determined
while only a small part has to bear higher/lower interest rates.29
1.D.2 ELB scenario
To conduct a ELB scenario I make the following two adjustments. First, I aug-
ment the Euler-equation with a preference/demand shock dt:
λt = e
Dtc−σct (53)
with
Dt = ρDt−1 + εdt . (54)
Second, I follow Erceg and Linde´ (2013) and set up the debt target as follows:
d¯t − d¯t−1 = ρ1(d¯t−1 − d¯t−2)− ρ2d¯t−1 + εbt , (55)
where the parameters are chosen as in the paper. I then simulate a relative
persistent debt reduction of up to 10%p below the steady state value of 100%.
Third, I have to log-linearize the model in order to follow the approach by Kulish
and Pagan (2017) to simulate the model at the ELB. The size of the demand
shock is then determined such that the ELB is binding for 4 quarters. This base-
line scenario is depicted in figure 1.12 and shows a deep recession with negative
inflation rates.
Figure 1.12: Baseline scenario when ELB is binding for 4 quarters.
 
 
The algorithm: There are two regimes, a so-called reference model, which is
labeled (M1) and that holds in steady state and to which the model dynamics
29Obviously, the shorter the average maturity would be, the closer get the short-term and
long-term rate.
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always converge to. For convenience, the reference model holds when the con-
straint is slack. Any such structural linear (or linearized) model can be written
in the following (general) form:
Axt = C +Bxt−1 +DEtxt+1 + Fεt (M1)
which has a reduced form solution
xt = J +Qxt−1 +Gεt. (M1 sol)
The ELB regime is given by the alternative model (M2):
A∗xt = C∗ +B∗xt−1 +D∗Etxt+1 + F ∗εt (M2)
where the matrices with a star (∗) account for the structural change, for instance
a binding ELB or forward guidance (i.e. an interest rate peg). As will be shown
below, the solution when (M2) applies, i.e. when a constraint is binding, will
look as follows (see Kulish and Pagan (2017), pg. 261):
xt = Jt +Qtxt−1 +Gtεt, (M2 sol)
where the time-varying coefficients of each matrix will be determined recursively
as follows (ELB is supposed to hold from 1 to T ):
Step 1: Simulate the model with (118): xt = J + Qxt−1 + Gεt, ∀t. If the
interest rate is indeed below iELB in the first period, set T = 2.
Step 2: Replace it∗ = i
ELB, ∀t∗ ∈ (1, . . . , T − 1) and simulate the model again,
now with the following solution:
xt =
J +Qxt−1 +Gεt ∀t > T − 1Jt +Qtxt−1 +Gtεt ∀t ≤ T − 1 (56)
with
Ξt = (A
∗ −D∗Q)−1 , Jt = Ξt (C∗ +D∗J) , Qt = ΞtB∗, Gt = ΞtF ∗ for t = T − 1
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Ξt = (A
∗ −D∗Qt+1)−1 , Jt = Ξt (C∗ +D∗Jt+1) , Qt = ΞtB∗, Gt = ΞtF ∗ for t < T−1
Step 3: If interest rate at time T is below iELB, increase T by 1 and repeat
step 2 and 3 until the interest rate is always greater or equal to iELB.
1.E Medium-scale DSGE model
In order to compare the results to a medium-scale DSGE model I use the model
by Carlstrom et al. (2017). This model is estimated on US data and features
a banking sector. I introduce a fiscal sector in the spirit of above simple fiscal
feedback rules. The following three equations are different to the papers’ model
overview in their appendix (name of variables are the same):
Yt = Ct +Gt + It
Bt + τtwtHt = Gt +R
L
t Bt−1
(1− τt) (w∗)1+εwη = εw
εw − 1
G1t
G2t
38
Chapter 2
Financial Repression in General
Equilibrium
2.1 Introduction
Financial repression allows governments to borrow at artificially low interest
rates. This may be the result of explicit or implicit ceilings on nominal interest
rates or other measures. It requires that investors are somehow held captive
through capital controls or regulatory policies (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973).
While financial repression has traditionally been considered a phenomenon spe-
cific to developing economies, Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015) argue—based on in-
stitutional details and the observation that real interest rates have been low and
often even negative—that financial repression has also been pervasive in many
advanced economies during the period after WW2. Figure 2.1 provides sugges-
tive evidence as it displays times series of US real interest rates after WW2. The
data show that the yield on longer-term US government debt (solid line) has
been relatively low until the late 1970s. In particular, long-term yields were not
systematically higher than the short-term interest rate (dashed line) in the first
half of the sample.1
In this paper, we seek to quantify the extent of financial repression in the US
1A similar picture emerges for nominal interest rates. The average interest rate on 10-
year government bonds during 1960–1974, for instance, is very similar to average federal funds
rate: 5.4 vs 5.2 percent. Instead, during 1980–2005 average long-term nominal rates were
considerably higher, also vis-a`-vis short term rates: 7.7 vs 6.5 percent (source: St. Louis
Fed/FRED).
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during the post-WW2 period—both in terms of its effects on interest rates and in
term of its contribution to the sizeable “liquidation of government debt” during
that period. Moreover, we ask how financial repression affected the macroe-
conomic performance of the US economy during that period. This question is
pertinent given the rather spectacular build-up of public debt in many advanced
economies during recent years. In many instances, the ratio of debt-to-GDP has
by now reached or even surpassed the debt levels observed at the end of WW2.
It is conceivable that, as with previous episodes, financial repression may feature
prominently in the mix of debt-reduction policies (Reinhart, 2012). Given poor
growth prospects and low inflation, financial repression has the benefit—at least
from a political-economy point of view—that it works stealthier than austerity
policies. It may also be less disruptive than outright default.2
Quantifying the extent of repression is challenging, because the interest rate
which would prevail in the absence of repression – say the “laissez-faire” interest
rate – is not directly observable.3 Earlier studies focused on developing coun-
tries. In this case one may proxy the laissez-faire interest rate with the interest
rate a government pays on world capital markets, as suggested by Giovannini
and de Melo (1993). They document that the “repression tax” contributed hand-
somely to government revenues.4 An earlier survey by Fry (1997) concludes that
financial repression contributed to government revenue in the order of 2 percent
of GDP in a sample of developing economies. In their study on 12 advanced
economies Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015) find that the savings of annual interest-
rate expenses amounted to up to 5 percent. This result assumes a constant,
repression-free interest rate in the range between 1 and 3 percent.
In our analysis we rely on a dynamic general equilibrium model in order a) to
estimate of the laissez-faire interest rate and b) to study the general equilibrium
effects of repression through counterfactual experiments. Our model is a conven-
tional New Keynesian business cycle model which features leverage-constrained
banks (as in Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler and Karadi, 2013). The essen-
2Reinhart, Reinhart and Rogoff (2015) survey a menu of options for debt reduction which
includes financial repression.
3The laissez-faire interest rate as defined in this paper will generally differ from the natural
rate of interest which would prevails if prices and wages are flexible. In a flex-price world, for
instance, there may still be repression which pushes the actual (and hence the natural) rate
below the laissez-faire rate.
4Giovannini and de Melo (1993) investigate 24 countries during the period 1972–1987. They
find several instances in which the annual amount of“revenue”that is due to financial repression
amounts to 5 percent of GDP.
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Figure 2.1: Short and long real interest rates on US government debt
 
Notes: Long real interest rates (ex post) is given by solid line, it is the return on marketable
debt of government portfolio computed by Hall and Sargent (2011); dashed line is three
month T-bill rate minus actual inflation (source: St. Louis Fed).
tial feature of our model is an additional constraint under which banks operate.
Specifically, we follow Chari, Dovis and Kehoe (2019) and assume that banks face
a “regulatory constraint” which requires them to hold a certain fraction of their
assets as government debt. As governments vary this fraction they effectively
alter the yield on long term government debt. Our setup thus makes explicit
that the banking sector is a captive audience for government debt. In practice,
the regulatory constraint reflects a variety of measures on which the government
may rely, if only unintendedly, when it auctions off its debt at elevated prices.
In the model, the government issues long-term debt only, which is held either by
households or banks. Our focus on long-term government debt is motivated by
the evidence shown in Figure 2.1, but also by narrative accounts of financial re-
pression. First, in the late 1940s, the Fed, according to chairman Eccles, allowed
short rates to fluctuate, but maintained a ceiling of 2.5% for the long-term rate
(Chandler, 1949). This ceiling on the return of long-term debt kept to be a con-
cern during the negotiations of the Fed Accord in 1951 which made the Federal
Reserve less dependent of the Treasury. At the time the Treasury exchanged a
large amount of long-term non-marketable debt for marketable debt in order to
further keep long-term interest rates low (Hetzel and Leach, 2001). Similarly,
during the early 1960s, the US government conducted “operation twist” in or-
der to raise short-term rates (to attract foreign capital inflows) while keeping
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long-term rates low.
In our model, households can adjust short-term bank deposits freely. However,
as in Gertler and Karadi (2013) we assume that households face transaction
costs when they adjust their holdings of government debt. In equilibrium the
yield on long-term debt differs from short-term interest rates on deposit because
of two distinct factors. First, because banks are leverage constrained they are
unable to arbitrage away yield differences between short- and long-term rates.
A tighter leverage constraint because of, say, reduced net worth, raises, all else
equal, the difference between short-term and long-term rates. This difference can
be interpreted as a term premium due to market segmentation (Fuerst, 2015).
Second, financial repression, all else equal, reduces long-term yields and hence
tends to offset the term premium.
Against this background, we observe that the actual evolution of short and long-
term interest rates is consistent with the predictions of our model—under the
maintained hypothesis that financial repression was more pervasive in the post-
WW2 period compared to the post-1970s. The model rationalize the observation
that short and long-term rates differed hardly during the repression period be-
cause it predicts that repression offset the term premium.5
Because in our analysis financial repression operates along the yield curve, it is
consistent with the notion that government debt carries a “convenience yield”
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012). Importantly, the convenience
yield reflects investors’ preference for liquid and safe assets rather than regu-
latory measures. However, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) find
that the yield spreads between non-government and government debt are equally
responsive to the supply of government debt in case of short and long-term debt.
Also, recent estimates of the convenience yield by Del Negro, Giannone, Giannoni
and Tambalotti (2017) focus on a trend that is “common across maturities”.
Through financial repression the government effectively taxes the financial sector.
This is consequential for the economy at large, because banks are special in their
ability to monitor firms. As in Gertler and Karadi’s original formulation we
assume that all savings of households are channeled through banks in order to
fund investment projects. As repression distorts banks’ portfolio choice and
reduces their net worth, investment is crowded out and output and inflation
5Estimates of the term premium (which do not account for repression) also tend to show a
strong increase of the term premium after the 1970s (Adrian, Crump and Moench, 2015).
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decline. We also contrast financial repression with conventional monetary policy
measures such as a cut in the short-term policy rate. Repression and conventional
monetary policy may have a similar impact on public finances. Yet, monetary
policy differs from financial repression or regulation in general in that it impacts
short and long term real interest rates alike: “it gets in all the cracks” (Stein,
2013). More importantly still, we also show that repression and conventional
monetary policy transmit through the economy in profoundly different ways.
We estimate the model on quarterly US time series data for the period 1948–1974.
Our estimation is based on eight macroeconomic variables and, in addition, two
financial variables, namely equity returns and banks’ net worth. We find that
the model performs well. In particular the models’ prediction for the share of
government debt in banks’ portfolio aligns very well with actual developments,
even though those have not been considered in the estimation.
Turning to the issue at hand, we also use the model to compute the laissez-
faire interest rate. It is considerably higher than actual rates, except for a few
instances. However, the interest rate reduction varies considerably over time.
Next we quantify the contribution of financial repression to the reduction of
public debt during our sample period. We do this in two ways. First, we take
an accounting perspective and compute the counterfactual evolution of debt as-
suming the government had paid the laissez-faire rather than the actual interest
rate, keeping all else equal. We find that in the case the debt ratio would have
declined by 35 rather than by 60 percentage points.
In a second experiment, we account for general equilibrium effects. Once we
do that, we find that without repression the debt-to-output ratio would have
declined much faster than in case of repression. Intuitively, this is because in
the absence of repression the economy would have been on a more expansionary
trajectory. With financial intermediation less impaired, we observe an investment
boom in our counterfactual scenario. Also consumption and output are increased
relative to the actual developments. As a consequence, inflation is also higher in
the counterfactual scenario. These observations can explain why the debt ratio
declines faster. In this sense, repression was not contributing to the liquidation
of government debt at all. In our view, this finding is particularly noteworthy
given the conventional view that repression is part of a toolkit to bring about a
reduction of government. We find the conventional view confirmed merely from
an accounting point of view.
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A number of recent contributions are exploring different aspects of financial re-
pression. Our model builds on Chari et al. (2019), notably as we rely on their
regulatory constraint. Just like them our modelling of the banking sector is based
on Gertler and Karadi (2011). However, they abstract from nominal rigidities
and the conduct of monetary policy. Instead, they focus on the optimality of
financial repression in a world where governments lack commitment to paying
back its debt and may thus default on its liabilities. Importantly, they show
that under commitment a repression tax is inferior to directly taxing banks’ as-
sets because financial repression distorts not only banks’ asset holdings but also
their portfolio decision. Our analysis, instead, is purely positive as it seeks to
quantify the contribution of the repression tax to debt reduction and to explore
counterfactual outcomes.
Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) put forward a model where financial repression
raises money demand, say because of regulation that limits use of checks, ATMs
etc. This in turn raises the base on which the inflation tax operates. As result,
their model predicts that inflation and financial repression go hand in hand,
quite contrary to what our analysis suggests (see also Brock, 1989). There is
also recent empirical work which suggests that repression has been under way
during the recent euro area crisis (Becker and Ivashina, 2016; Ongena, Popov and
Van Horen, 2016). More generally, financial regulation has been found to impact
financial markets. Du, Tepper and Verdelhan (2018), for instance, rationalize
large and persistent deviations from covered interest rates in light of the new
regulatory environment put in place after the crisis. It seems to impair the
ability of financial intermediaries to carry out arbitrage away spreads between
the return of riskless securities. This mechanism operates at the heart of our
model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model
and explains how financial repression works in our model. Section 3 describes our
data, the estimation as well as the choice of our priors. It also presents results.
We answer the main questions in Section 4 as we quantify financial repression
and compute counterfactuals. A final section offers a short conclusion.
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2.2 The Model
Our analysis is based on a medium-scale New Keynesian model in which the
financial sector takes center state. Here our analysis builds on earlier work of
Gertler and Karadi (2013) and Chari et al. (2019). As we estimate the model
in Section 2.4, we require it to be sufficiently rich to capture the dynamics of
actual time-series data. In this regard we build on earlier work by Bianchi and
Ilut (2017), notably as far as the fiscal sector is concerned, and on Justiniano,
Primiceri and Tambalotti (2013). The economy is populated by four types of
agents: households, banks, firms and a government. We discuss their decision
problems in some detail below.
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of identical households which consume, save and supply
labor to an employment agency. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011) or Gertler and
Karadi (2013), a fraction f of household members are bankers and a fraction 1−f
are workers. Workers are employed by an intermediate good firm and earn wage
income. Bankers manage a financial intermediary, which collects deposits from
all households and funds non-financial firms and holds government bonds. There
is perfect consumption smoothing within the household. Over time, each member
may change its occupation, yet the fraction of household members in each occu-
pation remains constant. In particular, with probability 1−σ a banker quits and
becomes a worker next period, while with probability f (1− σ) a worker becomes
a banker. Once the banker exits its business, retained earnings are transferred
to the household and the bank shuts down. Any new banker obtains a startup
fund, ot, from the household. This setup ensures that financial intermediaries are
unable to finance all investment projects with retained earnings and thus remain
dependent on deposits.
The representative household maximizes lifetime utility subject to a budget con-
straint. Letting ct denote household consumption and ht hours worked, the
objective is given by
max
ct,Dht ,B
h
t ,ht
Et
∞∑
t=0
βteηd,t
(
log(ct − hcat−1)− χh
h1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
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subject to
s.t. ct +
Dht
Pt
+
P bt B
h
t
Pt
+
1
2
κb
(
P bt B
h
t
Pt
− b¯h
)2
≤(1− τt)
(
wtht + d
firms
t
)
+ τ trt +
Rst−1
Πt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rdt
Dht−1
Pt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
dht−1
+
(
1 + ρP bt
)
P bt−1
1
Πt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rbt
P bt−1B
h
t−1
Pt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
bht−1
−ot
In the expression above E0 is the expectation operator. Technological progress
(defined below) is non-stationary, hence logarithmic utility ensure the existence
of a balanced growth path. Additionally, there are (external) consumption habits
and cat denotes the average consumption in the economy. β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount
factor, χh is a positive constant and ηd,t a preference shock which follows an AR(1)
process.
In the budget constraint dht denotes real bank deposits and b
h
t holdings of real
government debt, which is costly to the extent that it differs from a target level
b¯h Gertler and Karadi (2013).
6 κb is a positive constant. τt is the tax rate,
wt the real wage, d
firms
t are dividends which accrue to households who own the
different firms (see below). τ trt are transfers, R
d
t is the ex post real return on
deposits, given by Rst−1Π
−1
t , where R
s
t−1 is the nominal interest rate on deposits
contracted in period t − 1 and Πt is inflation in period t. Rbt is the (gross) real
return on government bonds and will be defined in detail below. ot are transfers
to family members that start a new bank. Optimality for holding government
bonds requires the following condition to hold
EtΛt,t+1
(
Rbt+1 −Rdt+1
)
= κb
(
bht − b¯h
)
, (2.1)
where Λt,t+k = β
k λt+k
λt
denotes the household’s stochastic discount factor and λt
the Lagrange-Multiplier on the budget constraint.
2.2.2 Banks
A representative bank relies on deposits and retained earnings to fund either the
capital stock of non-financial firms or purchases of government debt. Letting st
denote the funding of non-financial firms by banks, bbt the stock of government
6This is meant to capture the limited participation of households in the market for govern-
ment debt.
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debt held by the bank and nt the banks equity position (or net worth), we can
write the balance sheet of the bank as follows:
st + b
b
t = d
h
t + nt.
Letting Rkt (to be defined below) denote the real return of investing in non-
financial firms, net worth evolves as follows:
nt+1 = R
k
t+1st +R
b
t+1b
b
t −Rdt+1dht ,
=
(
Rkt+1 −Rdt+1
)
st +
(
Rbt+1 −Rdt+1
)
bbt +R
d
t+1nt, (2.2)
where we use the bank’s balance sheet to obtain the second equation.
The expected present discounted value of a bank’s net worth at the time of exit
from the banking business is given by
Vt =
∞∑
k=1
(1− σ)σk−1EtΛt,t+knt+k. (2.3)
One important friction in the banking sector is an agency problem between in-
termediaries and depositors, because, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) or Gertler
and Karadi (2013), bankers may divert a fraction of assets. Specifically, we
assume that this fraction is θ ∈ (0, 1) for private-sector funding and ∆θ for gov-
ernment debt, where ∆ ∈ (0, 1). The former is easier to divert, because its value
is harder to observe by depositors. As a result, we require the following incentive
constraint to be satisfied for depositors being willing to lend to the bank:
Vt ≥ θst + ∆θbbt . (2.4)
Central to our analysis is the ability of the government to lower the yield on
government debt. To allow for this possibility we assume a regulatory constraint,
as suggested by Chari et al. (2019). Specifically, the following has to hold:
bbt ≥ Γt
(
bbt + st
)
.
Here Γt is the minimum share of government debt which banks need to hold
relative to the total amount of assets. We think of this regulatory constraint
as capturing a variety of measures such as those discussed by Reinhart and
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Sbrancia (2015) in some detail. Such measures may not literally force financial
intermediaries to hold a certain fraction of government debt in their portfolio.
Still they effectively raise the demand and thus price of government debt. As we
show below, this is precisely the implication of constraint (2.5). We rearrange
the regulatory constraint slightly
bbt ≥ γtst, (2.5)
with γt =
Γt
1−Γt .
Maximizing (2.3) subject to (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5) yields the first order conditions:
EtΛ˜t,t+1
(
Rkt+1 −Rdt+1
)
=
ζt
1 + ζt
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ˜t
+
µt
1 + ζt︸ ︷︷ ︸
µ˜t
γt = ζ˜t + µ˜tγt, (2.6)
EtΛ˜t,t+1
(
Rbt+1 −Rdt+1
)
= ∆ζ˜t − µ˜t, (2.7)
Here ζt and µt are the multipliers on the incentive and on the regulatory con-
straint, respectively. Λ˜t,t+1, in turn, is an augmented stochastic discount factor
defined below. Equation (2.6) relates the (expected) excess return of investing in
intermediate-good firms (relative to the deposit rate) to the tightness of the in-
centive constraint (2.4) and regulatory constraint (2.5). Intuitively, to the extent
that bankers are leverage constrained expected excess yields persist in equilib-
rium. Additionally, due to the distortion of the banks’ portfolio choice through
government regulation, a binding regulatory constraint (i.e. µt > 0) reflects an
artificially reduced demand for real capital, that results in a further elevated ex-
cess yield. This wedge rises, if the fraction of real capital that banks hold is low
(i.e. a high value of γt)
Equation (2.7), in turn, relates the (expected) excess return of investing in gov-
ernment debt (relative to the deposit rate). Government debt is long-term, as we
explain in detail below. Deposits, on the other hand, mature in the next period.
Therefore, (2.7) relates the difference between long and short-term interest rates,
to the tightness of the incentive constraint. Our model may thus rationalize a
term premium due to market segmentation (see Fuerst, 2015). In our setup,
there is market segmentation because households find it costly to adjust their
debt holdings and banks are leverage constrained. As a result, there are limits to
arbitrage and differences in expected yields persist in equilibrium. Yet, in addi-
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tion to the excess-return component (or “term premium”) reflected by ∆ζ˜t, there
is a “regulatory discount” which appears in equation (2.7) via µt. Recall that this
is the multiplier on the regulatory constraint. The tighter the constraint (2.5),
the lower the expected excess return on government debt. Intuitively, to the
extent that regulatory constraint binds, the price of government debt is pushed
up and (expected) yields are depressed because banks are incentivized to hold
on to them. Note that the expected excess return on government debt given in
(2.7) does not feature a liquidity premium, in line with the evidence.7
It is instructive to consider a version of the complementary slackness condition
associated with the regulatory constraint (2.5)
Et
{
Λ˜t,t+1
(
Rbt+1 − R˜t+1
)} (
bbt − γtst
)
= 0. (2.8)
Here R˜t+1 is the laissez-faire interest rate which would obtain if the regulatory
constraint were slack (µt = 0). This expression shows that whenever there is
financial repression, that is, whenever Rbt+1 < R˜t+1, the regulatory constraint
must bind. In our analysis below we assume that the regulatory constraint binds
throughout. However, the extent of repression will vary over time. Either because
of variations in γt or because, for a given γt, the tightness of the constraint,
captured by µt, will generally differ across periods and states of the economy.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2013) we also assume that the incentive constraint
binds always. It is then possible to the define the leverage ratio φt as follows:
st + b
b
t = φtnt, (2.9)
where
φt =
EtΛ˜t,t+1R
d
t+1
θ + θ∆γt − EtΛ˜t,t+1
[(
Rkt+1 −Rdt+1
)
+ γt
(
Rbt+1 −Rdt+1
)] . (2.10)
The leverage ratio falls in θ, the fraction of assets a banker can divert. Depos-
itors anticipate that the incentive for the banker to divert assets increase and
thus ask for more “skin in the game”. The leverage ratio rises with the excess
return on capital EtΛ˜t,t+1
(
Rkt+1 −Rdt+1
)
or bonds EtΛ˜t,t+1
(
Rbt+1 −Rdt+1
)
, since
that increases the value of staying a banker. Similarly, the leverage ratio rises
7Longstaff (2004) finds that liquidity premia on short-term and long-term treasuries are of
similar magnitude. In our model as well as in our empirical analysis below we do not distinguish
between the return on short-term deposits and the return on short-term government debt.
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with the discounted deposit rate EtΛ˜t,t+1R
d
t+1 as for given excess returns, the net
worth of the bank and thus the value of staying a banker increases. We can now
define the augmented discount factor as in Gertler and Karadi (2013):
Λ˜t,t+1 ≡ Λt,t+1
(
1− σ + σ∂Vt+1
∂nt+1
)
, (2.11)
with
∂Vt
∂nt
= EtΛ˜t,t+1
[(
Rkt+1 −Rdt+1
)
φt +
(
Rbt+1 −Rdt+1
)
γtφt +R
d
t+1
]
. (2.12)
The augmented discount factor used to price the excess return is thus a probability-
weighted average of the stochastic discount factor from the households and the
marginal increase in net-worth of the bank. Since both constraints are always
binding we arrive at
Vt = θst + ∆θb
b
t (2.13)
and
bbt = γt
(
bbt + st
)
. (2.14)
The aggregate stock of net worth nt depends on the returns of bankers that stay
a banker (probability σ) and the start-up funds for new bankers:
nt = σ
[(
Rkt −Rdt
)
st−1 +
(
Rbt −Rdt
)
bbt−1 +R
d
tnt−1
]
+ ot. (2.15)
2.2.3 Firms
We distinguish between four types of firms. There are intermediate good firms
which operate under perfect competition. They hire workers from the employ-
ment agencies and use the capital stock which is funded by banks. Next there a
monopolistically competitive retailers which are constrained in their price-setting
decision. Last, there are capital producers and the employment agencies.
Intermediate good firms
The representative intermediate good firm operates under perfect competition.
Its production function is given by
yt = (utkt−1)
α (Ztht(j))
1−α , α ∈ (0, 1).
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Here, production depends on the predetermined capital stock kt−1 and its uti-
lization ut. Zt represents exogenous labor-augmenting technological progress.
We allow it be non-stationary and assume that its growth rate, ηz,t ≡ ∆ logZt,
follows an AR(1) process Justiniano et al. (2013).
As price taker, the firm’s demand for labor and capital utilization satisfies the
optimality conditions
wt = p
m
t (1− α)
yt
ht
(2.16)
and
αpmt
yt
ut
= Ψ′(ut)kt−1. (2.17)
Here pmt denotes the real price of intermediate goods and Ψ(ut) = (1+κ)
−1(u1+κt −
1) is the cost of capital utilization. We assume that in steady state u = 1,Ψ(1) =
0 and define κ ≡ Ψ′′(1)
Ψ′(1) . After production takes place the intermediate goods pro-
ducer buys new capital goods of xt at price qt. Letting δ the rate of depreciation,
the the law of motion of the capital stock is given by
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 + xt. (2.18)
The capital stock is fully funded through banks. We follow Jermann (1998) and
Basu and Bundick (2017) in assuming that a constant fraction ν of the capital
stock is financed through bank loans, that is lt = νqtkt and the rest by equity
shares, et = (1− ν) qtkt (also held by banks).8 It thus holds
st = et + lt = qtkt. (2.19)
As a result, intermediate good firms are leveraged and banks’ returns from hold-
ing equity in intermediate good firms may be as volatile as in the data. In con-
trast to banks, firms’ leverage has no real implications due to perfect monitoring.
Therefore, the firm obtains loans at the prevailing real deposit rate Rdt .
The firm does not keep any retained earnings. Dividend payments thus amount
to dft = p
m
t yt − wtht − Ψ(ut)kt−1 − qtxt −
(
Rdt lt−1 − lt
)
. The return on equity
reflects price changes as well as dividends and is given by:
Ret =
et + d
f
t
et−1
=
Ψ′(ut)ut −Rdt νqt−1 −Ψ(ut) + (1− δ) qt
(1− ν) qt−1 , (2.20)
8We normalize the amount of shares to 1 such that et is the price of total shares.
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where the first order condition (2.17) has been substituted in. From the perspec-
tive of the bank, however, the total return on funding the capital stock is key,
that is, we have to add the gross return on its loan-payments less the new loan
given to the firm:
Rkt =
et + d
f
t +
(
Rdt lt−1 − lt
)
et−1
=
Ψ′(ut)ut −Ψ(ut) + (1− δ) qt
qt−1
. (2.21)
Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers j ∈ [0, 1] which
repackage and diversify intermediate goods. Retailers transform one unit of in-
termediated goods into one unit of the retail good such that marginal costs are
given by pmt .
Final goods consist of products of all retailers:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(j)
1
1+ωp,t dj
]1+ωp,t
.
Here ωp,t varies exogenously. Cost minimization implies that the demand for
goods of a generic retailer j is given by
yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)− 1+ωp,t
ωp,t
yt, (2.22)
where Pt(j) is the price charged by retailer j and Pt is the price index of the final
good given by
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
− 1
ωp,t
]−ωp,t
. (2.23)
ωp,t denotes the desired markup of prices over the marginal costs. We assume
that log (1 + ωw,t) follows an AR(1) process. We follow Rotemberg (1982) and
assume that the adjustment of priced entails some quadratic costs for the retail
firm:
act(j) =
1
2
ϕ
[
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− Πξt−1Π1−ξ
]2
yt(j)pt(j),
with ϕ determining the cost of price adjustments, Π is the steady state inflation
rate, ξ ∈ (0, 1) captures price indexation and pt(j) = Pt(j)Pt is the price in real
terms.
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Retailers set prices Pt(j) in order to maximize discounted life-time profits:
max
Pt(j)
Et
∞∑
k=0
Λt,t+k (1− τt+k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λτt,t+k
{(
pt+k(j)− pmt+k
)
yt+k(j)− act+k(j)
}
,
subject to the demand function (2.22).
Optimality requires the following condition to be satisfied
− 1
ωp,t
+ pmt
1 + ωp,t
ωp,t
− ϕ
(
Πt − Πξt−1Π1−ξ
)
Πt +
1 + ωp,t
ωp,t
ϕ
2
(
Πt − Πξt−1Π1−ξ
)2
+
Λτt,t+1
Λτt,t
ϕ
(
Πt+1 − ΠξtΠ1−ξ
)
Πt+1
yt+1
yt
= 0. (2.24)
Capital producers
Capital producers use final goods to produce capital goods subject to an adjust-
ment cost. They sell capital goods to intermediate good firms and distribute
profits to the household sector. The objective of capital produces is given by
max
xt
∞∑
k=0
Λt,t+k
{
qt+kxt+k − e−ηx,t+k
[
1 + Θ
[
xt+k
xt+k−1
]]
xt+k
}
Where ηx,t is an investment specific shock which we specify as an AR(1), Θ
[
xt
xt−1
]
=
κ
2
(
xt
xt−1
− eγ
)2
is the adjustment cost function with κ > 0 and γ is the steady
state growth rate of neutral technology. The associated first order condition is
given by
qt = e
−ηx,t
((
1 + Θ
[
xt
xt−1
])
+ Θ′
[
xt
xt−1
]
xt
xt−1
)
−Λt,t+1e−ηx,t+1
(
Θ′
[
xt+1
xt
]
x2t+1
x2t
)
.
If there are no adjustment costs, i.e. Θ[·] = Θ′[·] = 0, then qt = 1eηx,t , that is,
marginal Tobin’s Q is equal to the replacement cost of capital (the relative price
of capital).
Employment agencies
We follow Justiniano et al. (2013) and Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) and
assume that each household is a monopolistic supplier of a differentiated labor
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service which it sells to an employment agency. A unit mass of these agen-
cies aggregates the specialized types into a homogenous labor input and sells to
intermediate good firms:
ht =
[∫ 1
0
ht(j)
1
1+ωw,t
]1+ωw,t
. (2.25)
Here ωw,t denotes the desired markup of wages over the households’ marginal
rate of substitution between labor and leisure. We assume that log (1 + ωw,t)
follows an AR(1) process. Employment agencies maximize profits such that
labor demand is given by
ht(j) =
(
wt(j)
wt
)− 1+ωw,t
ωw,t
ht. (2.26)
Here wt(j) denotes the real wage paid to households j and wt is the aggregate
wage index given by
wt =
[∫ 1
0
wt(j)
− 1
ωw,t
]−ωw,t
. (2.27)
We further assume that each period only a constant fraction 1 − θw of housh-
olds/labor types can optimally adjust their nominal wages, the rest follows the
simple index rule
wt(j) = wt−1(j) (Πt−1eηz,t)
ξw (Πt−1eγ)
1−ξw . (2.28)
2.2.4 Government
In each period the government finances purchases, transfers and interest rate
payments by raising taxes and issuing nominal debt which is default free. The
maturity of government may exceed one period. Specifically, as in Woodford
(2001), we assume that one unit of government debt Bt issued in period t of-
fers the following payment stream: {1, ρ, ρ2, ρ3, . . . }. Here, the decay factor ρ
captures the average maturity of the bond. Letting plt denote the real price for
this bond, the market value of debt in real terms is given by bt = p
l
tBt. In the
absence of arbitrage across different maturities and given plt, the real price of
a bond in period t + k must be given by ρkplt. The ex post yield of holding
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long-term government debt in real terms is given by
Rbt =
1
Pt
+ ρplt
plt−1
. (2.29)
We write the budget constraint using variables measured relative to GDP. Specif-
ically, Rbt denotes the ex-post real interest rate of government debt, dt ≡ bt/yt
the debt-to-GDP ratio, yt real output, et the expenditure ratio (sum of purchases
and transfers) and τ totalt total tax revenues:
Rbtdt−1
yt−1
yt
+ et = dt + τ
total
t . (2.30)
We follow the setup by Bianchi and Ilut (2017) for expenditures and purchases.
Specifically, we decompose total expenditures into a short-term component est and
a long-term component elt. The long-term component follows a highly persistent
AR(1) process which is meant to capture the large and long-lasting transfer
programs (Great Society), while the short-term component will react on current
output to capture transfer adjustments over the business cycle. We use a hat to
denote the percentage deviation of a variable from its steady state, and a tilde
to denote a percentage point deviation. The process for short-term expenditures
is given by:
e˜st = ρ
s
ee˜
s
t−1 + (1− ρse)φyyˆt + εe,st . (2.31)
Government purchases gt are given by gt =
(
1− 1
%t
)
yt, where %t is an AR(1)
government spending shock. The purchases to expenditure ratio %t evolves ac-
cording to
%˜t = ρ%%˜t−1 + (1− ρ%)φ%yyˆt + ε%t (2.32)
which is smooth but additionally allows for a contemporanous feedback effect of
output to transfers (φζy).
The total amount of tax revenues is given by τ totalt = τt
(
wtht + d
firms
t
)
. We
assume that the tax rate adjusts according to the following rule:
τ˜t = ρτ τ˜t−1 + (1− ρτ )
(
φdd˜t + φ
τ
y yˆt
)
+ ητ,t, (2.33)
with iid stochastic disturbance ητ,t.
Finally, monetary policy sets the nominal short-term interest rate by following
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an interest rate rule
Rst
Rs
=
(
Rst−1
Rs
)ρr ((Πt
Π˜
)φpi)1−ρr
eηr,t (2.34)
where ρr a smoothing parameter, φpi and φy capture the reaction coefficients to
inflation and output respectively and ηr,t is an iid monetary policy shock.
2.2.5 Market clearing
At the aggregate level, the following resource constraint needs to be satisfied
yt = ct + gt + e
−ηx,t
[
1 + Θ
[
xt
xt−1
]]
xt +
1
2
ϕ
[
Πt − Πξt−1Π1−ξ
]2
yt + Ψ(ut)kt−1.
(2.35)
Since households and banking sector are investing in government debt the total
stock, and thus the real market value, is the sum of both
bt = b
b
t + b
h
t . (2.36)
2.3 Inspecting the mechanism
In what follows we develop some intuition for how financial repression impacts
public finances in particular and the economy in general. In a first step, we take
a partial equilibrium perspective and zoom in on the market for government
debt. Our discussion assumes that debt is held exclusively by banks: Bbt = Bt.
Further, we abstract from inflation and assume a constant fiscal surplus st = s.
We then consider a simplified version of the government budget constraint:
P bt Bt =
1 + ρP bt
P bt−1
P bt−1Bt−1 − s.
This expression implicitly defines the supply curve of government debt: it relates
the current price of debt P bt to the quantity of bonds Bt, given outstanding
liabilities and bond prices in the previous period. The supply curve is downward
sloping because a higher bond price reduces the amount of debt which needs to
be placed with banks in order to redeem a given amount of outstanding debt net
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Figure 2.2: Stylized representation of market for government debt
B
S
DP˜ b
RC
D′P b
µ
Notes: Supply (demand) of debt represented by blue (black) line. Regulatory constraint
represented by RC curve. P˜ b is the laissez-faire price of debt. P b is the actual price.
Repression shifts demand for government debt upward.
of the surplus. We depict the supply curve as the blue solid in Figure 2.2. It is
labeled “S”.
The same figure also features a demand curve for government debt, labeled “D”,
that determines the demand for government debt in the absence of repression
or, equivalently, in case the regulatory constraint is not binding. Without loss
of generality we assume it to be horizontal. As Rbt =
1+ρP bt
P bt−1
, it is implicitly
determined by the bankers’ optimality condition (2.7) that ties the return on
government debt to the deposit rate. The deposit rate, in turn, is proportional
to the time-discount factor thanks to optimality condition (2.1). The intersection
of “D” and “S” in Figure 2.2 determines the “laissez-faire” price P˜ b of debt that
prevails in the absence of repression.
Because bt = P
b
t Bt, the regulatory constraint (2.5) implies
P bt Bt ≥ γtst.
For a given market value of firms, st, the regulatory constraint defines a downward
sloping relationship between the price of debt and the amount of debt that needs
to be held by banks whenever the regulatory constraint binds. It is shown as
a hyperbola in Figure 2.2, depicted in red and labeled RC. Intuitively, the
constraint is satisfied with equality if either the volume held by banks is high
and the price is low, or vice versa.
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What determines the equilibrium in the market for government debt? Since we
assume that the regulatory constraint binds, the equilibrium price P b is given by
the intersection of RC and S. It exceeds the laissez-faire price. This price is con-
sistent with the demand curve, because in case of repression the demand curve
for government debt shifts upward (from D to D′). Formally, this is brought
about by a positive realization of the Lagrange multiplier µ in the bankers’ op-
timality condition (2.7). Because holding an additional unit of government debt
provides additional value to the bank if the regulatory constraint binds, bankers
are ready to purchase government debt at a price which exceeds the laissez-faire
price. Equivalently, for a given price of government debt in the next period,
repression lowers the yield on government debt. At the same time, due to repres-
sion the government needs to issue less debt in order to meet a given financing
requirement.
How does the economy adjust to financial repression? In order to illustrate
essential aspects of the transmission mechanism we simulate a simplified version
of the model outlined in Section 2.2.9 Specifically, we assume that the economy is
initially in steady state as the regulatory constraint tightens temporarily. There is
in other words a shock to γt. We contrast the effects of this repression shock with
those of a conventional monetary policy shock, that is, an exogenous reduction
of the short-term policy rate.
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response functions. The blue solid line is the
response to the repression shock. The red dashed line is the response to the
(expansionary) monetary policy shock. Here vertical axes indicate deviations
from steady state and horizontal axes indicate time in quarters. Focus first on
the repression shock. The upper panel of figure 2.3 shows the implications for
public finances and inflation. Increased financial repression—via the regulatory
constraint—requires banks to hold a higher fraction of their portfolio in govern-
ment debt. All else equal they increase their demand for debt which in turn
raises its price (not shown) and lowers the expected return (upper right graph).
The reduction of the interest rate, all else equal, reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio
(lower middle graph). However, initially public debt increases because repres-
9Specifically, we assume that debt is held exclusively by banks, there is no habit persistence,
wages are set in a perfectly competitive way, there are no government expenditures (purchases
or transfers), monetary and fiscal rules have no smoothing terms, monetary policy adjusts
interest rates only in response to inflation and there are taxes are lump-sum. We also assume
that monetary policy is active and fiscal policy is passive, following the notation by Leeper
(1991). Results are qualitatively similar for the estimated model as we show below.
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Figure 2.3: Dynamic effects of repression vs conventional monetary policy
Public finances
 
 Macroeconomic dynamics
 Notes: Responses to repression shock (blue solid line) vs cut of policy rate (red dotted line).
Vertical axis measures deviations from steady state, horizontal axis measures time in quarters.
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sion raises the price of outstanding debt, and thus the holding period return
HPR (lower left graph). Furthermore the reduction in inflation increases the real
market value of debt. Therefore, the net effect of a repression shock on the debt
ratio is ambiguous and likely to change over time.
The lower panel of Figure 2.3 shows how the repression shock transmits into
the economy. As the regularity constraint tightens, banks respond by rebalanc-
ing their portfolios: they reduce their funding of firms as they are forced to
hold more government debt. As a result, the price of investment (Tobins Q)
declines (upper left graph) as does investment (lower left graph). As stressed by
Chari et al. (2019), repression distorts the optimal allocation of capital. Repres-
sion crowds out investment via this portfolio effect. In addition, there is a net
worth effect : since the value of investment and the return on government decline,
banks net worth declines (upper middle graph).10 This kicks off a second round
effect. First, since banks’ equity is directly linked to real lending (due to mar-
ket segmentation), investment drops even further which drives the economy into
a prolonged recession (lower right graph). Second, since net equity is reduced,
households withdraw their deposits from the banks, as the value of staying a
banker falls and households only have limited enforcement capabilities. This ad-
ditionally reduces lending and thus enhances the drop in investment and output.
Even though the increase in repression dies out after 20 quarters, output is still
below its steady-state value (lower right graph). This, in turn, may put upward
pressure on the debt-to-GDP ratio, as we discuss below.
At times, some commentators also refer to low policy rates as “financial repres-
sion”. In our model, financial repression shares some features with conventional
monetary policy, but is fundamental different in other dimensions. To illustrate
this, the red dashed line in Figure 2.3 shows the responses to a cut in the in-
terest rate. Focus on the upper panel first: we consider a cut in the policy rate
which induces a decline of ex ante interest rates comparable to the one observed
in response to the repression shock (upper right graph). The ex ante interest
rate declines because prices are sticky and hence expected inflation (lower right
graph) does not fully offset the change in the policy rate. The long-term rate
declines with the short-term rate thanks to no-arbitrage conditions. Also, the
holding period return on government debt evolves similar to what happens in
response to repression (lower left graph). The public-debt-to-output ratio (lower
10This is despite the increase of the HPR on government debt in the first period, as it is
more than offset by the loss in market value of the investment into real firms.
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middle panel) declines more strongly in response to the monetary policy shock,
because the cut in the policy rate is expansionary. Yet, in sum, as far as public
finances are concerned, the effects of the monetary shock are comparable to the
repression shock.
There are stark differences when it comes to the transmission into the economy,
shown in the lower panel of Figure 2.3. The reduction of interest rates stimulates
household consumption (lower middle graph). In the process, households reduce
their savings with banks (upper right graph). To meet the regulatory constraint
banks have to reduce their funding of firms, as the increase in net worth (upper
middle graph) is more than compensated by the fall in deposits. As a result
investment declines somewhat (lower left graph).11 However, the economy ex-
pands due to increased consumption. In contrast to the repression shock, the
effect of the monetary policy shock on output is less persistent than in case of
the repression shock because bankers’ net worth is much less affected.
2.4 Estimation
We estimate the model using Bayesian estimation techniques. In this section, we
first describe the dataset used to estimate the parameters of model. Afterwards,
we outline the choice of the prior distribution of the parameters and report the
corresponding posterior distributions.
2.4.1 Data
We estimate the model using ten time series of US quarterly data from 1948Q2–
1974Q4. Four of these series are macro time series, four are fiscal time series and
two time series capture the financial sector.
We obtain real per capita GDP growth from NIPA (nominal GDP: Table 1.1.5,
line 1 and GDP deflator: Table 1.1.4, line 1). We follow (Leeper, Plante and
Traum, 2010) in constructing the population series. Furthermore, we use the
real per capita growth rate of private investment, which is the sum of personal
11Since the liability side shrinks, so does the asset side. Financial repression is still present
in steady state, however, therefore the relative share of public debt and funding of firms has
to be kept similar. The reduction in liabilities is thus met by a reduction of investment and
government debt (not shown) of a similar size.
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consumption expenditures on durable goods (Table 1.1.5, line 4) and gross private
domestic investment (Table 1.1.5, line 7). Additionally, we include the inflation
rate, measured as the quarterly log difference of the GDP deflator. Since the
Federal Reserve started targeting a specific rate only from June 1954, we use
as measures for the nominal interest rate the secondary market rate of the 3m
Treasury Bill until 1954Q2 and thereafter by the effective Federal Funds rate.12
As fiscal time series we include the market value of debt relative to GDP13government
purchases, government expenditures and government revenues. We obtain the
market value of debt from Cox and Hirschhorn (1983), data for government pur-
chases, expenditures and revenues from NIPA. We transform government pur-
chases to be consistent with %t in the model and define government expenditures
as the sum of purchases and transfers, all relative to GDP.14 We compute tax
revenues as the difference between current receipts (NIPA Table 3.2, line 37) and
current transfer receipts (NIPA Table 3.2, line 16).
As financial frictions are at the heart of our analysis, we also use two financial
time series in the estimation: bank equity and equity returns.15
12Both rates are not completely identical but follow a very close pattern as demonstrated by
a correlation coefficient of 0.98 for 1954Q3 to 1974Q4.
13We use the market value of privately held government debt. Since we assume a consolidated
budget we abstract from debt held by the Federal Reserve or U.S. government accounts.
14Data for purchases are from NIPA tables Table 3.2, line 21 (consumption) Table 3.2, line
41 (investment) and Table 3.2, line 43 (net purchases of non-produced assets) minus Table 3.2,
line 44 (consumption of fixed capital). Transfers are given by the sum of net current transfer
payments (Table 3.2, line 22 and line 16), subsidies (Table 3.2, line 32), and net capital transfers
(Table 3.2, line 42 and line 38).
15We retrieve bank equity from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Specifically, we use total capital accounts for all commercial banks from H.8. - Assets and
Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the U.S., transform it into real per capita values as explained
below and take the growth rates as observable. We always use the last available entry for each
quarter. To compute equity returns we use the mean quarterly price and dividend data on
the US stock market provided by Shiller (2005), deflate it and calculate the return on equity
including the dividend payments.
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,
where dl is 100 times the log difference of each variable while the rest is the
observed ratio. Remember that a hat ( ˆ ) denotes the log-deviation and tilde
( ˜ ) the linear deviation from steady state. Note that in the model most variables
inherit the non-stationarity of the technological progress Zt. We therefore express
variables in deviations from the non-stationary trend (a). Then, we (log-)linearize
the model around its non-stochastic steady state.
The estimation sample starts in 1948Q2 because the population series only goes
back until 1948. It ends in 1974Q4 for two reasons: First, in 1974 the federal
debt to GDP ratio is the lowest after WWII and thus this period is characterized
by a large reduction in the debt to GDP ratio from 75.5% to 16.9%. Second,
the period afterwards, especially after the appointment of Volcker 1979 marks a
shift in the conduct of monetary policy, see for example Clarida, Gali and Gertler
(2000) or Bianchi and Ilut (2017).
2.4.2 Choice of prior distribution
Most of the parameters have been estimated before and we therefore follow the
choices of the corresponding literature, e.g. Justiniano et al. (2013) and Bianchi
and Ilut (2017). As for the banking sector we follow the suggestions by Gertler
and Karadi (2013). The left panel of Table 2.1 summarizes the the prior distri-
bution of the model parameters.
The first block contains parameters which characterize the behavior of policy,
starting with the amount of regulation in steady state, γ. For the prior mean
(and the external validation of the time series below) we use the available date
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Table 2.1: Prior and posterior distribution of estimated parameters
Prior Posterior
Dist Mean SE Mode Mean 5 percent 95 percent
Γ Regulation N 0.30 0.05 0.2672 0.2693 0.2068 0.3331
φpi MP on inflation N 1.00 0.50 0.4912 0.4834 0.4025 0.5678
τd Tax on debt N 0 0.05 0.0569 0.0500 0.0201 0.0778
τy Tax on output N 0.20 0.20 0.5717 0.5235 0.3097 0.7183
φy MP on output G 0.25 0.10 0.1665 0.1585 0.0711 0.2439
ιy Exp share on output N 0.10 0.20 0.0805 0.0708 -0.2614 0.3876
φesy SR-exp on output N 0.20 0.40 -0.5897 -0.5984 -0.7358 -0.4518
100µ Repression discount G 0.50 0.20 0.5328 0.6247 0.2435 0.9930
ζ˜ Term Premium N 1.00 0.25 1.3440 1.3473 1.0710 1.6275
φ Leverage ratio N 6.00 1.00 7.3049 7.0104 5.6399 8.3585
σ Survival rate banker N 0.50 0.25 0.0055 0.0081 0.0003 0.0150
ν Loan share N 0.50 0.25 0.6121 0.6106 0.5575 0.6660
σnt ME networth IG 0.50 0.05 0.6746 0.6763 0.5741 0.7754
ξpi Price indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.4218 0.4125 0.2624 0.5622
ξw Wage indexation B 0.50 0.15 0.4638 0.4644 0.2153 0.7012
κpi NKPC-slope G 0.30 0.15 0.0010 0.0011 0.0006 0.0017
θw Wage adjustment B 0.66 0.10 0.9224 0.9022 0.8604 0.9463
ϕ Frisch elasticity G 2.00 0.25 1.9964 2.0253 1.6174 2.4464
κ Inv. adjustment G 4.00 1.00 2.3691 2.3757 1.8494 2.8583
κ Utilization cost G 5.00 1.00 5.0375 5.2346 3.5656 6.9161
100pi Inflation N 0.75 0.05 0.7548 0.7533 0.6707 0.8337
100γ Growth N 0.59 0.05 0.5258 0.5278 0.4576 0.6011
d Debt to GDP N 1.49 0.10 1.6533 1.6526 1.4971 1.8071
% Purchases N 1.12 0.01 1.1113 1.1122 1.0998 1.1243
τ Tax revenue N 0.17 0.01 0.1631 0.1634 0.1515 0.1754
AR(1) shocks
ρΓ Regulation B 0.60 0.20 0.9962 0.9951 0.9913 0.9991
ρi MP B 0.60 0.20 0.9785 0.9730 0.9542 0.9922
ρτ Tax rate B 0.60 0.20 0.5112 0.5603 0.3728 0.7452
ρx Investment B 0.60 0.20 0.8714 0.8650 0.8069 0.9254
ρ% Purchase/Exp. B 0.60 0.20 0.9806 0.9773 0.9598 0.9954
ρz Tfp B 0.20 0.05 0.2106 0.2142 0.1303 0.3014
ρd Demand B 0.60 0.20 0.8121 0.7738 0.6585 0.8913
ρes Short exp. B 0.20 0.05 0.1414 0.1484 0.0859 0.2071
ρµpi Price markup B 0.60 0.20 0.1107 0.1440 0.0314 0.2484
ρw Wage markup B 0.60 0.20 0.4968 0.4688 0.3009 0.6448
Std shocks
σΓ Regulation IG 1.00 1.00 1.0516 1.0855 0.9164 1.2517
σi MP IG 0.50 0.50 0.1694 0.1726 0.1528 0.1924
στ Tax rate IG 2.00 2.00 0.5730 0.6195 0.5039 0.7365
σx Investment IG 10.00 2.00 5.3883 5.5231 4.7167 6.2626
σ% Purchase/Exp. IG 1.00 1.00 3.6991 3.7351 3.2023 4.2611
σz Tfp IG 1.00 1.00 0.6141 0.6128 0.4712 0.7591
σd Demand IG 10.00 2.00 9.7390 9.6738 7.9758 11.3357
σes Short exp. IG 2.00 2.00 0.4837 0.5011 0.3981 0.6000
σµ Price markup IG 1.00 1.00 0.3400 0.3457 0.2913 0.3980
σw Wage markup IG 2.00 2.00 1.0890 1.3444 0.6852 2.0361
Notes: N stands for the Normal, B the Beta, G the Gamma and IG the inverted Gamma
distribution.
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from H.8 above and calculate the share of government debt relativ to investment
for the commercial banks.16 The sample mean is a little above 0.3 and a standard
deviation of 0.05, hence the values for the prior beta distribution. We allow in
our analysis for different regimes of monetary and fiscal interaction. In partic-
ular, we will concentrate on uniquely determined bounded rational expectation
equilibria. These regimes exhibit either an active monetary authority coupled
with an passive fiscal authority (regime M) or a passive monetary authority cou-
pled with an active fiscal authority (regime F ). Regarding the parameters in the
policy function we set a prior distribution such that both regimes can potentially
prevail. The prior distribution of the monetary reaction coefficient on inflation,
φpi, is a normal distribution centered around 1 with a standard deviation of 0.5
and on output, φy, a gamma distribution with mean 0.25 and standard deviation
of 0.1. The prior distribution of the coefficient on debt in the tax rule, τd, is a
normal distribution with mean 0 and a standard deviation of 0.05 and on out-
put, τy, is a normal distribution with mean 0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.2.
The response coefficient of government spending and the coefficient determining
the response of short-run expenditures to the output gap are assumed to have a
normal distribution with mean 0.1 and 0.2 respectively.
The next block deals with parameters for the banking sector. The amount of
repression discount µ in steady state has a gamma distribution with mean 0.5
and standard deviation of 0.2. The mean was chosen in line with Reinhart and
Sbrancia (2015) who find that repression is around 2% annually for the United
States. We use a normal distribution for the the term premium, ζ˜, and the
steady state leverage ratio φ with mean 1 and 6 and standard deviations of 0.25
and 1 respectively. We choose a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation of 0.25 for the probability of staying a banker, σ and the amount of
bonds that is financed by loans, ν. We include a measurement error in the series
of networth with an inverse gamma centered tightly at 0.5. We follow Gertler
and Karadi (2013) and calibrate κb to 1, since the data was not informative about
its value.17
The indexation parameter for wage as well as price indexation follow a beta
distribution with mean 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.15. For the slope
coefficient in the Phillips curve we specify a Gamma distribution with a mean
16Specifically, we use the item “U.S. Govt. obligations” and “Loans and investments” on a
quarterly basis as above.
17Our results are robust to alternative values.
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of 0.3 and standard distribution 0.15. For the parameter controlling the wage
stickiness we formulate a beta distribution with mean 0.66 and standard deviation
0.1. For the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, for the parameters governing the
investment adjustment costs and capacity utilization costs we select a gamma
distribution with a mean of 2, 4 and 5 respectively. The standard deviations of
these distributions imply a wide prior distribution.
We specify values for steady-state inflation, GDP growth, the steady-state values
of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the government purchases-to-GDP ratio and the tax-
to-GDP ratio according to a normal distribution centered around the sample
means.
We choose an beta distribution with mean 0.6 and a standard deviation of 0.2
for the autoregressive parameters, which are not related to government expendi-
tures. In order to ensure the identification of the short- and long-run components
of government expenditures, we follow Bianchi and Ilut (2017) and specify a beta
distribution with mean of 0.2 and a standard deviation of 0.05 for the autore-
gressive parameter of the short-run expenditure shock and the growth-rate of
total factor productivity. The autoregressive coefficient of the long-run compo-
nent is calibrated to 0.99. As prior distributions for the standard deviations of
the structural shocks we employ inverted-gamma distributions and use the same
mean and standard deviations as Bianchi and Ilut (2017) when using the same
shocks. The prior of the investment specific shock has a mean of 10 with a stan-
dard deviation of 2 since previous literature usually finds large posterior means.
The prior of the wage mark-up shock is centered at 2 with standard deviation
2. Furthermore, we calibrate the discount factor β to 0.995, the share of capital
α to 0.3, the amount of habit h to 0.9 and the average maturity to its sample
mean of 5 years.
Before we estimate the model, we verify that all parameters are identified locally,
using the method by Iskrev (2010).18
2.4.3 Results
We approximate the posterior distribution of the estimated parameters using a
random walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We run two chains with 2,000,000
draws each. In order to assess convergence of the chains, we compute several
18The results and statistics are available upon request.
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measures following Brooks and Gelman (1998).19 We find that the interval of
the posterior distribution which is covered by the chains as well as the second
moment of the posterior distribution are stable after approximately 1,000,000
draws. We report results based on every second draw of the last 250,000 draws
of each chain.
The right panel of Table 2.1 reports the compares the posterior mode, mean and
the 90-percent credible intervals. Most of our estimates of structural parameters
are in line with the literature for similar kinds of medium-scaled DSGE models,
e.g. Bianchi and Ilut (2017) or Justiniano et al. (2013). In the Appendix we plot
the prior and the posterior distribution of each parameter.
Our estimates indicate that the sample period is described by regime F. This
finding is in line with Bianchi and Ilut (2017) and Davig and Leeper (2006). More
precisely, we estimate the reaction coefficient of monetary policy on inflation
smaller than 1 which implies a passive monetary policy regime. The estimated
coefficient of the tax rate on the debt to GDP ratio might appear at first high
with its mean of 0.05 for a fiscal authority which does not adjust taxes in order
to stabilize outstanding debt. However, this is the coefficient on the tax rate
and not on total taxes. Moreover, what matters for determinacy is the response
of the government surplus. We estimate that government expenditures increase
strongly whenever output falls (the reaction coefficient is roughly −0.6). Thus
in total, the surplus does not sufficiently adjust to government debt in order to
stabilize outstanding debt.
2.4.4 External validation
It is instructive to compare the predictions of the model with data which have
not been used in the estimation. For this purpose, we display, in the left graph of
figure 2.4, the share of public debt in the portfolio of the banking sector. The solid
line represents the actual data, as provided by Board of Governors (see Section
2.4.1 above). During our sample period the share of debt declines from some
55 percent to less than 10 percent. The dashed line shows the model prediction
for the share of public debt in the portfolio of the banking sector (Γt). While
the model underpredicts the share of public debt at the beginning of the sample
somewhat, the model predictions aligns fairly well with actual developments.
19We provide the univariate convergence in the Appendix.
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Figure 2.4: Data vs. model prediction
 
 
Notes: Data (solid line) vs. model prediction (dashed line). Left panel shows share of public
debt in banks’ portfolio estimated (data source: Board of Governors), right panel shows
return on government debt (data source: Hall and Sargent (2011)).
Note that the time series was not used in the estimation and hence the model
performance in this regard provides some external validation.
The right panel of Figure 2.4 shows the ex-post real return on government debt
predicted by the model and contrasts it with a time series compiled by Hall and
Sargent (2011). They use market prices for all marketable public bonds and
calculate the (ex-post real) holding period return. Their measure thus captures
changed in bond valuations which are not reflected in interest rate expenses
computed on actual coupon payments. We find once more that the prediction of
the model performs quite well.
Finally, we also compare the ownership structure of government debt in the model
(households and financial institutions) to an empirical counterpart.20 In principle
US government debt is also held be foreign investors. However, the share of debt
held by foreigners is very small in our sample period (approximately 6 percent).
Regarding the debt holdings of households and the financial sector we find again
that the model performs well. It predicts that about 20 percent of government
debt were held by households (and 80 percent by financial institutions). This
share is relatively stable during our sample period. In the data the share is 22
and 74 percent respectively.
20The empirical estimates are taken from table OFS-2 in the Treasury Bulletin, specifically
from the volumes of December 1964, December 1979 and November 1982, published by the
St. Louis Fed. The average share of household holdings is calculated as the share of total
individuals relativ to total Federal securities outstanding. The average share of household
(or foreign) holdings is calculated as the share of total individuals (Foreign and international)
relative to total Federal securities outstanding.
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2.5 Financial repression in the United States
1948–1974
We are finally in a position to address the questions that motivate our analysis:
how large was financial repression during our sample period and what was its
effect on macroeconomic performance? By construction the estimated model ac-
counts for the strong decline of public debt during our sample period. However,
as we argued above, the model also predicts the behavior of other important vari-
ables quite well, even though they have not been included in the estimation. We
are thus confident that the estimated model allows us to answer these questions
accurately.
In a first step towards quantifying the contribution of financial repression, we
compute the laissez-fair interest rate, that is, the interest which would have
prevailed in the absence of repression. We obtain it, as we turn to equation
(2.7) and set µ˜t to zero.
21 The left graph of Figure 2.5 contrasts the laissez-faire
interest to the actual interest rate, both measured from an ex post point of view
in real terms. The laissez-faire rate exceeds the actual interest rate by several
percentage points, notably in the early sample period. The gap between the
two rates declines over time, but it is not trivial in most periods. This suggests
that financial repression was sizeable, in line with the findings of Reinhart and
Sbrancia (2015).
Put differently, our estimates suggests that the US government was able to bor-
row at artificially low interest rates. How strongly did this contribute to the
reduction of public debt? There are different ways to approach this question.
The first approach relies on simply accounting. Namely, we can compute the
evolution of debt under the assumption that, all else equal, the government
would have borrowed at the laissez-faire interest rate. The right graph of Figure
21Our estimates indicate that µ˜t is negative most of the time, i.e. banks wanted to hold
more public debt than allowed by the constraint. Hence, through the lens of the model, the
observed low HPR was not caused by low ex-ante returns but the result of surprise reductions of
repression over time (negative shocks lower µ˜t). This result is partly driven by the underlying
maturity structure of Woodford (2001), in which the HPR is affected strongly by capital gains
and losses, since all bonds are traded each period. We chose Woodford (2001), as it seems
to be the most common approach to modelling long-term debt. However, in future work one
should model the maturity structure of government bonds following Krause and Moyen (2016).
In such a framework, long-term interest rates are a weighted average of past and new rates,
which puts less weight on capital gains and losses. Empirically, this seems to be more relevant,
as not all debt is rolled over every period.
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Figure 2.5: Repression in the US 1948–1974
 
  
 
 
Notes: Left panel shows actual (solid line) and laissez-faire (dashed line) interest rate (real,
ex post); right panel shows actual evolution of debt-to-GDP ratio (solid line) and
counterfactual evolution assuming the laissez-faire interest rate (dashed line).
2.5 shows the result as it contrasts the evolution of debt under this assumption
(dashed line) to the actual development (solid line). We find that while the actual
decline of debt amounted to some 60 percentage points during our sample period,
the decline would have been only about 35 percentage point if the government
would have paid the laissez-faire rate. Hence, all else equal, the debt-to-GDP
ratio would have been about 25 percentage points higher at the end of 1974.22
However, it is unlikely that other things would have been equal because repression
impacts not only public finances, but also the economy in general. We now
develop a counterfactual scenario which accounts for this possibility. Specifically,
we simulate a counterfactual scenario based on our model economy but we assume
that there is no regulatory constraint. Otherwise we leave the model unchanged
as we compute the equilibrium outcome. In particular, we assume that the model
economy is exposed to the same shocks and governed by the same parameter and
policy rules as the estimated model.
Figure 2.6 shows the results. It displays the behavior of four selected time series
under the counterfactual (dashed line), contrasting it to the actual outcome (solid
line). Two observations stand out. First, the debt-to-output ratio would have
declined faster in the absence of repression. This result is perhaps surprising,
22Hall and Sargent (2011) consider the period 1945-74 during which public debt fell by 80
percentage points. Growth in real GDP and primary surpluses each contributed roughly 40
percent to the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. 20 percent of the decline, however, were
due to negative real returns. Note that our analysis differs in that we contrast the effect
of repression by comparing actual interest rates to the laissez-faire interest rates (which is
generally larger than zero).
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Figure 2.6: Actual data vs. counterfactual in the absence of repression
 
  Notes: Actual time series (black solid line) vs. counterfactual outcome in the absence of
repression (red dashed line).
but can be rationalized in light of the second observation: we find that, by and
large, the economy would have been on a more expansionary path in the absence
of repression.
Given our earlier discussion about the economy-wide effects of financial repres-
sion in section 2.3 above this is hardly surprising: financial repression distorts
financial intermediation. It constrains banks in their ability to channel funds
from households to firms. Confirming this insight, we find that in the counter-
factual scenario, investment is much higher without repression. In addition, we
observe that there is a consumption boom.
Higher consumption and investment implies that output is higher as well as
inflation. Lastly, we also observe that fiscal surpluses are higher in the coun-
terfactual. Overall, these developments rationalize why public debt would have
declined more strongly. In the absence of repression.
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2.6 Conclusion
How large was financial repression in the US in the aftermath of WW2? We
find that repression lowered the interest rate at which the government borrowed
by several percentage points. The actual interest rate in our sample period was
considerably lower than the laissez-faire rate. We define the laissez-faire rate
as a counterfactual object: the interest which would have been observed in the
absence of repression. We can recover it on the basis of our estimated model and
it fluctuates over time just like the actual interest rate.
Did repression make an important contribution to the decline of public debt?
Here the answer is: “it depends”. In an accounting sense the contribution was
rather large. If we compute the evolution of public debt on the basis of the laissez-
faire rate and keep everything else equal, the decline of the debt-to-GDP ratio
during our sample period would have been less pronounced: the ratio would have
declined by approximately 35, rather than by 60 percentage points. However, a
full-fledged counterfactual should also take into account the broader implications
of financial repression for economic performance. Once we do that, we find that
repression slowed down the decline of public debt relative to output. This finding
can be rationalized in light of the answer to a third question.
What was the impact of repression on the economy? Repression distorts financial
intermediation and thus hampers investment and growth. We illustrate this
effect through model simulations. For our counterfactual we also find that this
effect has been large during our sample period. Absent repression the economy
would have expanded more strongly and this is why the debt-to-GDP would have
declined more strongly in the absence of repression.
72
Appendices
2.A Debt accounting
In order to account for debt dynamics we decompose of the change in the debt to
GDP ratio between 1948Q2 and 1979Q3 into nominal return, inflation, growth
and deficits. We use the linearized government budget constraint
d˜t =
Rl
Πeγ
d(Rˆlt − pˆit − yˆgrowtht ) +
Rl
Πeγ
d˜t−1 − s˜t (37)
with ˜ denoting linear deviations from steady state and ˆ log-deviations, d the
debt to GDP ratio, Rl the nominal return on debt, pi the inflation rate, ygrowth
the per-capita growth rate, and s surplus to GDP ratio. We can re-write the
budget constraint in terms of debt to GDP differences, taking advantage that
d˜t+1 − d˜t = dt+1 − dt, with the latter denoting the actual public debt ratios.
dt+k − dt−1 =
k∑
i=0
Rld
Πeγ
Rˆlt+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
nominal return
−
k∑
i=0
Rld
Πeγ
pˆit+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
inflation
−
k∑
i=0
Rld
Πeγ
yˆgrowtht+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth
−
k∑
i=0
s˜t+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus
+restt−1+i
(38)
with restt−1+i =
∑k
i=0
(
Rl
Πeγ
− 1
)
d˜t−1+i, but it accounts for less than 0.5% of the
reduction. Table A.1 depicts the results: The debt-ratio was reduced by roughly
53%-points, most of it was due to inflation and growth, surplus did reduce the
ratio especially in the beginning of the sample but the deficits in the late 1970s
increased the debt ratio again.23 Since we put in all components of the govern-
ment budget constraint as observables, expect the return, the results in table
A.1 are basically data-driven, the estimation itself does not affect the numbers
much. However, what is unobservable, is the return on government debt in the
23We add the respective level effects, as for example a log-linear inflation rate of -0.5% is
still positive inflation if the steady state of inflation is 1%. Hall Sargent find that surplus did
contribute quite significantly to the debt reduction. When inspecting both surplus series we
noticed a difference which is not due to different definitions of expenditures and tax revenues
but data revision.
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Table A.1: Debt reduction accounting
Decomposition debt evolution
Debt in 1948Q2 75.5%
Debt in 1979Q3 16.6%
Change -59.0%
Nominal return 21.6%
Inflation -30.7%
Growth -22.9%
Deficit / GDP -27.0%
Notes: Accounting is similar to Hall and Sargent (2011). Surplus not as important due to
updated time series which lowered surplus rate.
absence of repression.
2.B Estimation details
Figure 2.7: Prior vs. posterior distribution
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Figure 2.8: Univariate convergence statistics.
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Figure 2.9: Multivariate convergence statistics.
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Chapter 3
The Power of Forward Guidance
in a Quantitative TANK Model
3.1 Introduction
Interest rate forward guidance has become an important tool for central banks to
enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy at the zero lower bound (Fed, 2008;
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013). In this paper, we quantify the macroeconomic
effects of forward guidance within an estimated medium-scale two-agent New
Keynesian (TANK) model. This framework serves as a simple approximation
to a fully-fledged heterogeneous agent New Keynesian model (see for instance
Bilbiie, 2019b; Debortoli and Gal´ı, 2018). Such models can dampen the strong
aggregate effect of forward guidance, that is inherent in many complete market or
representative agent models. One reason is that full heterogeneity features lower
intertemporal substitution of households, which reduces the responsiveness of
present macroeconomic aggregates to changes in future interest rates (McKay,
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2016; Bilbiie, 2019a).1
As is already well known, strong intertemporal substitution is caused by forward-
looking behavior (Del Negro, Giannoni and Patterson, 2015; Kiley, 2016).2 One
1This introduces some form of discounting into the Euler equation (McKay, Nakamura
and Steinsson, 2017). Discounting can be also achieved through deviations from rational ex-
pectations, as for instance with incomplete information (Angeletos and Lian, 2018), bounded
rationality (Gabaix, 2018) or level-k thinking (Garc´ıa-Schmidt and Woodford, 2019).
2Take as a baseline the following forward guidance scenario: the central bank pegs the
interest rate at a low level for the next T quarters, which will lead to an expansion and inflation
in all T quarters. Now suppose that the peg is extended by one period, i.e. until T + 1. This
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possibility to attenuate the forward-looking behavior within the model would
therefore be to introduce some heterogeneity on the households side, in which
one type of household behaves “as usual” and another type does not smooth
consumption intertemporally. These latter agents are typically called hand-to-
mouth households, which have no access to financial markets and can thus neither
borrow nor save. Therefore, they are not forward-looking.
However, having a model with two agents does not automatically imply a re-
duction in the power of forward guidance compared to the representative agent
model. As shown analytically by Bilbiie (2008, 2019b), the overall strength of in-
tertemporal substitution depends on the elasticity of the hand-to-mouth agents’
income to aggregate income. The reason is that this elasticity shapes the relative
strength of the so-called direct and indirect effects of forward guidance (for such
a distinction, see also Kaplan, Moll and Violante, 2018).
The direct effect of changes in interest rates refers to the impact in the absence
of changes in household income / general equilibrium and usually works via in-
tertemporal substitution. As an example, when nominal interest rates fall, all
else equal, real rates fall as well. This induces households to save less and to
increase their demand for consumption. Complementary to this direct effect is
the indirect effect of monetary policy. It operates through the general equilib-
rium increase in labor demand and thus income which is necessary to satisfy the
increase in consumption demand. Higher household income raises consumption
even further and so on. As discussed in Kaplan et al. (2018) or Luetticke (2019),
in representative agent models most of the transmission of monetary policy on
output and inflation is due to the direct effect of intertemporal substitution. In
contrast, in heterogeneous agent models the indirect effect dominates.
Taken together, the introduction of hand-to-mouth households can increase or
decrease the power of forward guidance. This depends on which of the two effects
dominates. As Bilbiie (2019b) shows analytically for a simple two-agent model,
the introduction of hand-to-mouth households reduces the direct effect of for-
ward guidance, as only a smaller fraction of households smooths intertemporally.
will lead to a stimulus in T + 1 which raises inflation in T + 1 and thus lowers the real rate
in T . Since monetary policy is constrained by the peg there is a further stimulus in period T
which also raises inflation in T and lowers real rates in T − 1. This process continues until the
present. As monetary policy does not counteract any stimulus until T+1, the cumulative effect
of a future expansion rises more, the longer the peg and thus the further away the marginal
extension. If monetary policy would not be constrained by a peg, it would simply raise its
policy rate and thus limit the aggregate response.
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However, it enhances the indirect, i.e. general-equilibrium effect, since the higher
marginal propensity to consume of hand-to-mouth households raises per se their
own (and thus total) consumption. If, in addition, their income “over-reacts” to
changes in aggregate income (which happens with no or too little redistribution),
the amplification through the indirect effect dominates and the power of forward
guidance increases compared to the representative agent model.3
Our contribution is to illustrate under which conditions the direct or indirect
effect dominates in an empirically realistic two-agent model. We estimate a
medium-scale version on eight euro area time series and evaluate the quantitative
implications of hand-to-mouth households to dampen the power of forward guid-
ance. For plausible ranges of parameters the power of forward guidance is indeed
reduced compared to our representative agent benchmark version. The amount
of attenuation depends on the degree of countercyclical transfers (similar to au-
tomatic stabilizers in McKay and Reis, 2016) and the share of hand-to-mouth
households. If there is no or “too little” redistribution, our model amplifies the
impact of forward guidance on the economy relative to the benchmark repre-
sentative agent model. Moreover, we evaluate the combined effects of forward
guidance and the Eurosystem’s asset purchase program. We find that the com-
bined impact of asset purchases and forward guidance is higher than the sum
of each policy used in isolation. This difference increases with the horizon of
forward guidance.
Although our two-agent model can dampen the power of forward guidance, it
does not feature a mechanism to solve the so-called forward guidance puzzle: an
unreasonably large response of inflation and output that rises exponentially if
the horizon of interest rate guidance is extended.4 This paper rather emphasizes
a simple, yet empirically realistic, extension of medium-scale New Keynesian
models – heterogeneity and countercyclical transfers – that allows to substantially
tame the power of forward guidance.5 For realistic values of the share of hand-to-
3Note that Kaplan et al. (2018) point to fiscal policy as an important driving force in their
heterogeneous agent model.
4A possibility to solve the forward guidance puzzle is to include uninsurable income risk,
an essential feature of heterogeneous agent models (e.g. McKay et al., 2016; Werning, 2015).
Bilbiie (2019a) shows how uninsurable income risk generates discounting (or compounding)
in the Euler equation and that this can solve the forward guidance puzzle if it is combined
with procyclical income inequality (i.e. hand-to-mouth households income decreases/increases
relative to unconstrained households income in a boom/recession). Acharya and Dogra (2019)
show within a setup of special preferences that adding (procyclical) income risk can solve the
forward guidance puzzle even absent heterogeneity in the marginal propensities to consume.
5The odds ratio favors our two-agent model over its representative agent version essentially
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mouth households and countercyclical transfers our model attenuates the impact
of forward guidance by up to 40% compared to the representative agent version.6
The next section describes the framework used with a special emphasis on the
two crucial features of rule-of-thumb households and the transfer scheme. Section
3.3 gives an overview of the data and the estimation results. Section 3.4 describes
the forward guidance simulations conducted in this paper before the final section
concludes.
3.2 Framework
The model builds heavily on the medium-scale New Keynesian model of Carl-
strom et al. (2017) that features a rich financial sector which allows to analyze the
effects of unconventional monetary policy measures. We augment their frame-
work by rule-of-thumb consumers in the spirit of Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido and Valle´s
(2007) and a simple transfer rule (Bilbiie, 2008). The economy consists of house-
holds, firms and a banking sector, which will be explained in detail below. In a
nutshell, real investment is ultimately financed by financial intermediaries, whose
lending capacities are constrained by their net worth.
3.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by two types of households: A measure 1 − λ of
households has complete access to financial markets and can smooth consump-
tion through short-term deposits and the accumulation of real capital – we call
them Ricardian households. The remaining fraction λ has no access to finan-
cial markets (it can neither borrow nor save) and consumes its wage income and
transfers – we call them hand-to-mouth (rule-of-thumb or constrained) house-
holds.
Each Ricardian household maximizes lifetime utility
with probability one.
6The richer model allows us to show that the mere introduction of hand-to-mouth house-
holds can in principle attenuate the impact of forward guidance, i.e. without the necessity
to introduce countercyclical transfers. For example, if wages are assumed to be very sticky
(re-optimization only every 20 quarters), the (above mentioned) indirect effect is much weaker
while the direct effect is still in place (for the implications of sticky wages and hand-to-mouth
households, see Colciago, 2011).
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Et
∞∑
s=0
βsdt+s
{
ln
(
Cot+s − hCot+s−1
)−BH1+ηt+s
1 + η
}
, (3.1)
where Cot denotes private consumption, h degree of habit, Ht the (individual)
labor input (scaled by B to normalize labor input in steady state) and dt a shock
to the linearized discount factor given by:
dt = (1− ρd) ln(d) + ρddt−1 + d,t (3.2)
The budget constraint is given by
Cot +P
k
t I
o
t +
Dt
Pt
+ (1 + κQt)
Ft−1
Pt
= wtHt +R
k
tKt +
Dt−1
Pt
Rdt−1 +divt−T ot +
QtFt
Pt
(3.3)
Households invest in real capital P kt It, save deposits
Dt
Pt
and repay their outstand-
ing debt including a coupon payment of 1, (1 + κQt)
Ft−1
Pt
(see below).7 They earn
labor income wtHt (to be specified below), a return on capital R
k
tKt and deposits
Rdt−1
Dt−1
Pt
and dividends divt net of taxes T
o
t (which consists of a lump-sum part
and a re-distributive part, see section 3.2.5 for details). divt includes dividends
from the FI (divFIt ), capital goods producer (div
CP
t ) and intermediate goods pro-
ducer (divIPt ).
There is a need for intermediation through the financial system since all invest-
ment purchases of the household must beforehand be financed by issuing new
investment bonds (hence, there is loan in advance constraint). The price of such
bonds is denoted by Qt and offers the following payment stream of the household,
following Woodford (2001): 1, κ, κ2, . . . etc.8 Let CIt denote the number of new
perpetuities issued in time t, then the household’s stock of nominal liabilities Ft
is given by
Ft = κFt−1 + CIt ⇔ CIt = Ft − κFt−1. (3.4)
The loan in advance constraint is then given by:
P kt It ≤
QtCIt
Pt
(3.5)
7Note that they have also access to short-term government bonds, but those are perfect
substitutes with deposits. Dt can thus be interpreted as the households net resource flow into
the FIs (Carlstrom et al., 2017).
8Due to the recursive structure, κhQt is the time t price of such a bond that was issued in
period t− h.
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The law of motion for capital follows:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It. (3.6)
The representative Ricardian household therefore maximizes utility (3.1) subject
to the budget constraint (3.3, multiplier ϑt), the loan in advance constraint (3.5)
and the law of motion for capital (3.6). The first order conditions are given by:
Λt =
bt
Cot − hCot−1
− Et βhbt+1
Cot+1 − hCot
(3.7)
Λt = Etβ
Λt+1
Πt+1
Rdt with Πt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
(3.8)
ΛtMtQt = Et
βΛt+1 (1 + κQt+1Mt+1)
Πt+1
(3.9)
ΛtMtP
k
t = EtβΛt+1
[
Rkt+1 +Mt+1P
k
t+1 (1− δ)
]
(3.10)
with Mt = 1+
ϑt
Λt
or ΛtMt = Λt+ϑt. The first two equations comprise the typical
Euler-equation for deposits, the third one for investment bonds. Note that the
demand for capital (last equation) is distorted by the time-varying distortion
Mt which depends on the multiplier of the loan-in-advance constraint (3.5). As
discussed in great detail in Carlstrom et al. (2017), this distortion acts like a
mark-up on the price of new capital and is basically the term premium that
exists due to the segmented markets and the leverage constraint of the banks
that limit the arbitrage across the term structure (see next subsection).
The budget constraint of hand-to-mouth agents is much simpler as they neither
borrow nor save and only consume their labor income less taxes:9
Cht = wtHt − T ht , (3.11)
where their consumption is Cht , labor income is wtHt (see below) and T
h
t are
9Such a behavior can be rationalized for instance by myopic behavior, a lack of access to
capital markets or ignorance of intertemporal trading opportunities. As pointed out by Gal´ı
et al. (2007), this is a rather extreme form of non-Ricardian behavior, which nevertheless
capture the observed heterogeneity in consumption responses and income as found in the data.
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taxes that hand-to-mouth households have to pay. Overall taxes are given by a
time-invariant component T h and a countercyclical transfer scheme:10
T ht =
τ
λ
(Yt − Y ) + T h. (3.12)
τ ≥ 0 captures the degree of countercyclical transfers which rebates income
whenever aggregate output is different from steady state (Yt − Y ) – see section
3.2.5 for more details and how the optimizers pay for that transfer.11 Although
this transfer scheme is stylized, it captures in a parsimonious way automatic
stabilizers that are found in more complex settings (see for instance Leeper et al.,
2010).12 Additionally, it seems the most direct way to introduce redistribution
within the two heterogeneous agents.
3.2.2 Labor agencies
Each household supplies a specialized type of labor Hjt , independent of whether
it is a Ricardian or a rule-of-thumb household (in the spirit of Erceg et al., 2000).
Since firms do not differentiate between the two households when hiring labor
for a specialized type j, the supply of hours and the wage rate is the same
for both groups. The labor agencies bundle the specialized labor inputs into a
homogeneous labor output that it sells to the intermediate good firm according
to
Ht =
[∫ 1
0
(
Hjt
)1/(1+λw,t)
dj
]1+λw,t
(3.13)
where λw,t is the wage mark-up, following (in linearized form)
λw,t = (1− ρλw) ln(λw) + ρλw(λw,t−1) + λw,t . (3.14)
10The time-invariant component ensures that in steady state consumption is similar across
households (i.e. Ch = Co, see also Gal´ı et al., 2007).
11Bilbiie (2019a) proposes to rebate firm profits. In our model not all kinds of profits would
imply a taming of the impact of forward guidance. For instance, bank profits would amplify the
aggregate effects because they are strongly procyclical (reduction of interest rates constitutes a
capital gain for banks, raising profits). In contrast, intermediate good profits are countercyclical
(similar to mark-ups after demand-type driven shocks).
12The study of more complex transfer rules or distortionary taxes seems interesting, but is
beyond the scope of the paper.
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The demand for the different types of labor inputs is given by
Hjt =
(
W jt
Wt
)− 1+λw,t
λw,t
Ht (3.15)
In each period, the probability of resetting the wage is (1− θw), while with the
complementary probability (θw) the wage is automatically increased following
the indexation rule:
W jt = Π
ιw
t−1W
j
t−1
The maximization problem of a given union for the specialized labor input j is
given by (similar to Colciago, 2011):
max
W˜t
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθw)
s
{
(1− λ)u (Cot+s)+ λu (Cht+s)− dt+sΛat+sBH1+ηt+s1 + η
}
s.t. the budget constraints (3.3), (3.11) and labor demand (3.15) and with Λat+s =
(1− λ) Λot+s + λΛht+s.13
3.2.3 Financial intermediaries
The financial intermediaries (FI) in the model use accumulated net worth Nt and
short-term deposits Dt to finance investment bonds Ft and long-term government
bonds Bt. Their balance sheet is given by:
Qt
Bt
Pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bt
+Qt
Ft
Pt︸ ︷︷ ︸
F t
= Nt +
Dt
Pt
= LtNt, (3.16)
where Lt denotes leverage. Note that investment and government bonds are
perfect substitutes since they offer the same payment streams and thus are valued
at the same price Qt. Define the return on those bonds as R
L
t :
RLt ≡
1 + κQt
Qt−1
. (3.17)
13We define Λht+s = dt+s
1
cht+s
, i.e. without habit. The simulation results do not change
qualitatively if we also introduce habit there.
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Every period a financial intermediary receives the coupon payment of 1 from
its old assets in t − 1, which it additionally sells completely. Its income is thus
(1 + κQt)
(
Bt−1
Pt
+ Ft−1
Pt
)
. It purchases new assets at price Qt, such that the real
value of these purchases is Qt
(
Ft
Pt
+ Bt
Pt
)
. It further collects new deposits Dt
and has to pay out interest rate expenses on the deposits of the previous period
Rdt−1
Dt−1
Pt
. Any change in the net worth from steady state will be costly: f(Nt)Nt,
with f (Nt) =
Ψn
2
(
Nt−N
N
)2
.14 Thus, the remaining dividend payments are given
by interest income less the expenditures:
divFIt = (1 + κQt)
(
Bt−1
Pt
+
Ft−1
Pt
)
+
Dt
Pt
−Qt
(
Ft
Pt
+
Bt
Pt
)
−Rdt−1
Dt−1
Pt
−f(Nt)Nt
⇔ divFIt + (1 +Nt) f(Nt) =
Pt−1
Pt
((
RLt −Rdt−1
)
Lt−1 +Rdt−1
)
Nt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
profits
, (3.18)
where the definition of the return RLt and the banks’ balance sheet (3.16) were
substituted. This equation shows that profits will be partly paid out as divi-
dends divFIt to the (Ricardian) households while the rest is retained as net worth
for subsequent activity. The FI discounts dividend flows using the (Ricardian)
household’s pricing kernel augmented with additional impatience ζ < 1, which
allows for a positive excess return of long-term debt over deposits in steady
state.15
The FI then chooses dividends divFIt and net worth Nt to maximize expected
dividend payments
Vt = Et
∞∑
s=0
(βζ)sΛt+sdiv
FI
t+s (3.19)
subject to (3.18). This yields the following first-order condition:
Λt [1 + f (Nt) +Ntf
′ (Nt)] = EtΛt+1βζ
Pt
Pt+1
[(
RLt+1 −Rdt
)
Lt +R
d
t
]
. (3.20)
The FIs are subject to a simple hold-up problem which limits their ability to
attract deposits (in spirit similar to Gertler and Karadi, 2013). We follow the
14As will be shown below, a leverage constraint (due to a “hold-up” problem) limits the
ability of the FI to attract deposits and thus eliminates the arbitrage opportunity between
long and short rates. However, this limit to arbitrage could be undone by an increase in net
worth (implicitly, that would be a lump-sum transfer (tax) on the (Ricardian) households).
The net worth adjustment cost ensure that this does not happen.
15It can be shown that RL = Rd + 1−ζζL R
d > Rd if ζ < 1.
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approach by Carlstrom et al. (2017) completely and arrive at the following ex-
pression for the leverage constraint Lt:
16
Lt =
1[
1 + (Φt − 1)Et R
L
t+1
Rdt
] , (3.21)
where Φt measures exogenous changes in the financial friction:
Φt = (1− ρΦ) Φ + ρΦΦt−1 + εΦ,t. (3.22)
3.2.4 Goods market
Perfectly competitive final goods producers combine differentiated intermediate
goods Yt(i) into a homogeneous good Yt according to the technology:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+λp,t di
]1+λp,t
where λp,t is the time-varying price mark-up that evolves according to
λp,t = (1− ρλp) ln(λp) + ρλpλp,t−1 + ελp,t . (3.23)
Profit maximization leads to the following demand function:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)− 1+λw,t
λw,t
Yt, (3.24)
with
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
− 1
λw,t di
]−λw,t
. (3.25)
A continuum of monopolistic competitive firms combines capital Kt−1 and la-
bor Ht to produce intermediate goods according to a standard Cobb-Douglas
technology. The production function is given by:
Yt(i) = AtKt−1(i)αHt(i)1−α (3.26)
16Details of the derivation can be found in their paper.
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with
At = (1− ρa) ln(A) + ρaAt−1 + A,t. (3.27)
The intermediate goods producers set prices based on Calvo contracts. In each
period firms adjust their prices with probability (1− θp) independently form
previous adjustments. Those firms that cannot adjust their prices in a given
period will re-set their prices according to the following indexation rule:
Pt(i) = Π
ιp
t−1Pt−1(i).
Firms that can adjust their prices face the following problem:
max
P ∗t
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsp
βsΛt+s
Λt
P
∗
t
(
s∏
k=1
Π
ιp
t+k−1
)
Pt+s
Yt+s(i)− Wt+s
Pt+s
Ht+s(i)−Rkt+sKt−1+s(i)
 ,
subject to labor demand (3.15) and Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−εp,t
Yt. It holds that dividends
are given by divIGt = Yt − wtHt −RktKt−1.
The capital goods producers take final output It and sell it (with a mark-up)
subject to adjustment costs to the households, therefore dividends divCPt =
P kt I
n
t −It = P kt µt
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
It−It, where the investment specific technology
shock follows an AR(1) process:
µt = (1− ρµ) ln(µ) + ρµµt−1 + εµ,t. (3.28)
The profit maximization is then described by
max
It
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsΛt+s
[
P kt+sµt+s
[
1− S
(
It+s
It+s−1
)]
It+s)− It+s
]
. (3.29)
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3.2.5 Government policies
The central bank follows a Taylor rule when setting its short-term policy rate
Rt:
17
ln (Rt) = (1− ρ) ln (R) + ρ ln (Rt−1) + (1− ρ) (τpi (pit − pi) + τy(yt − yt−1)) +Rt
with
Rt = (1− ρm) ln(R) + ρmRt−1 + εR,t. (3.30)
The government collects taxes Tt in a lump-sum fashion and issues govern-
ment bonds QtBt
Pt
to finance its outstanding debt including coupon payments
(1 + κQt)
Bt−1
Pt
.18 Its simple budget constraint is given by:
QtBt
Pt
+ Tt = (1 + κQt)
Bt−1
Pt
. (3.31)
Note that tax-income Tt = λT
h
t +(1− λ)T ot is net of the countercyclical transfers
paid to hand-to-mouth households. Implicitly, there is redistribution of counter-
cyclical transfers τ (Yt − Y ) from optimizing to hand-to-mouth households (via
the government). The respective tax rules for both agents are given by the
following two equations:
T ot =
1
1− λ
(
T t + T o − τ (Yt − Y )
)
(3.32)
T ht = T
h +
τ
λ
(Yt − Y ) . (3.33)
For simplicity, only the Ricardian households finance the government. Addi-
tionally, they are involved in the countercyclical transfer system in which the
hand-to-mouth households participate as well. The degree of countercyclicality
is given by τ . T o and T h are chosen such that consumption of hand-to-mouth
households and Ricardian households coincide in steady state.19
17Since short-term government debt and bank deposits are perfect substitutes it holds that
Rdt = Rt.
18Since debt-stabilizing taxes are levied on Ricardian households only, there is no feedback
of debt-dynamics on decisions due to Ricardian equivalence. However, this does not apply to
the redistribution scheme.
19As the focus of this paper is on the effect of forward guidance when a fraction of households
does not feature forward-looking behavior – and not so much about different consumption
distributions – we view that assumption as being largely justifiable.
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3.2.6 Aggregation
Taking the household and the government budget constraint, as well as all divi-
dend payments, one arrives at the aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct + It + f(Nt)Nt, (3.34)
where aggregate consumption and investment are given by a weighted average of
the respective variables for optimizer and rule-of-thumb households:
Ct = (1− λ)Cot + λCht (3.35)
and
It = (1− λ) Iot . (3.36)
Similarly, the aggregate capital stock is given by
Kt = (1− λ)Kot . (3.37)
3.3 Estimation
After linearizing the model around the steady state we estimate it using Bayesian
estimation methods. We use eight quarterly euro area time series with the sample
period 1999Q1 to 2014Q4.20 In this section, we first describe the dataset, fol-
lowed by description of the calibration and prior distributions of the respective
parameters. Finally, we report the corresponding posterior distributions.
3.3.1 Data
We use a total of eight observables for the euro area: real GDP per capita, real
investment, gross inflation, employment growth, real wage growth, the first dif-
ference of the short- and long-term interest rate, and real bank net worth growth.
The time series on bank net worth is taken from the European Central Bank’s
MFI Balance Sheet Items Statistics. All the other variables are taken from the
20We stopped the estimation before interest rates (especially the 3-month Euribor) turned
negative in 2015Q2 in our sample.
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Area-wide Model database of the ECB.21 Since we have only seven structural
shocks in the model, we add a measurement error to the observations equation
for bank net worth in order to avoid stochastic singularity.
Per capita output and investment are obtained by dividing real GDP (YER) and
investment (ITR) by the number in the labor force (LFN). Growth rates are log-
differences. Inflation is measured as the growth rate of the seasonally adjusted
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICPSA). Employment growth is the
log-difference of the total employment (LNN). For the real wage series we first
divide the nominal wage rate per head (WRN) by the HICPSA and then take the
log-difference. Our short-term nominal interest rate is the 3-month Euribor rate
(STN) and our long-term nominal interest rate the euro area 10-year government
benchmark bond yield (LTN). Real bank net worth is obtained by dividing the
nominal capital and reserves of euro area monetary financial institutions (exclud-
ing eurosystem) (NWB) by HICPSA and taking the log-difference. All series are
demeaned with their respective sample mean.22

dlGDPt
dlInvestmentt
dlGDPDeflatort
ShortInterestRatet
LongInterestRatet
dlHourst
dlWagest
dlNetwortht

= 100 ·

0
0
log(Π)
log(Π/β)
log(Π/β) + 0.01/4
0
0
0

+

yˆt − yˆt−1
xˆt − xˆt−1
pˆit
rˆt
rˆL,10t
hˆt − hˆt−1
wˆt − wˆt−1
nˆt − nˆt−1 + εn,t

,
We match the long-term interest rate time series to the yield-to-maturity of the
10 year government bond rˆL,10t = logR
L,10
t − logRL,10, with RL,10t = 1Qt + κ (see
Carlstrom et al., 2017).
3.3.2 Calibration and prior distributions
As is common in the literature, we calibrate a subset of the structural parame-
ters to ensure identification. We follow mostly the calibration of Carlstrom et al.
21We use the 18th update of the Area-wide Model (AWM) database from August 2018.
22An estimation of the steady states (for instance inflation) did not change the results much.
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(2017).23 The time preference β is set to 0.99, yielding a steady state annual
real interest rate of roughly 4%. The labor income share α is set to 0.33 and the
depreciation rate to δ = 0.025, which implies a 10% annual depreciation of the
capital stock. The steady state mark-ups of prices and wages are set to 20%,
i.e. λw = λp = 0.2. The leverage ratio is set to 6 which implies ζ = 0.9854.
We impose that in steady state the annual long-term rate RL is one percentage
point above the short-term one, i.e. RL = RL,10 = R + 0.01/4 (see the obser-
vation equation).24 In order to estimate the model with a 10-year government
bond (similar to its empirical counterpart) we set κ = 0.975. It was not possi-
ble to identify the share of hand-to-mouth households λ and the redistribution
coefficient τ simultaneously in the data. We therefore calibrate the share of con-
strained households to 30% since there is empirical evidence for such a share (e.g.
Dolls, Fuest and Peichl, 2012; Bilbiie and Straub, 2013; Fe`ve and Sahuc, 2017).25
The prior choices are largely taken from Carlstrom et al. (2017) and are sum-
marized in columns 2 to 4 of Table 3.1. The first block of parameters determine
the shape of the utility and cost functions. For the amount of habit h, we use
a beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2. The inverse
Frisch elasticity η has a relatively flat prior centered around 2. The prior mean
and standard deviation for the investment adjustment costs ΨI are taken from
the posterior mode of Coenen, Karadi, Schmidt and Warne (2018).
For the amount of indexation and the amount of stickiness we use a beta dis-
tribution centered around 0.6 and 0.7, respectively, with a standard deviation of
0.1 for all four parameters.
The prior of the degree of monetary persistence is a beta distribution with mean
0.7 and standard deviation of 0.1. The two Taylor coefficients on inflation and
output follow both a normal distribution centered around 1.5 and 0.5 respec-
tively. For the size of redistribution we took a relatively flat prior around 0.3
(the share of hand-to-mouth households).
We specify for all autocorrelations of the shocks a beta distribution which is cen-
tered around 0.6 with a standard deviation of 0.2.26 All priors for the standard
23We cross-check with values from Smets and Wouters (2003) which studied the euro area,
but the results were largely unchanged.
24In the data the long-term rate for the sample period was roughly 1.5pp higher than the
short-term rate. However, results were basically unchanged when we estimated the model with
this higher value.
25As a cross check we estimated the model with the calibrated redistribution τ (at the
posterior mean of Table 3.1) and found a share of hand-to-mouth households of around 0.35.
26Note that for better identification of the autocorrelation of the monetary policy shock and
the persistence in the Taylor rule we use a slightly tighter prior on the persistence, see above.
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Table 3.1: Prior and posterior distribution of estimated parameters
Prior Posterior
Dist Mean SE Mode Mean 5 percent 95 percent
Utility & technology
h Habit B 0.5 0.2 0.7721 0.7759 0.7120 0.8443
η Inverse Frisch G 2 0.5 1.7190 1.8942 1.1331 2.6954
ψI Investment adj.costs G 10 1.0 14.097 14.188 12.306 15.996
ψN Net worth adj. costs G 3 1.0 5.8016 6.2013 4.3656 7.9765
Stickiness
ιp Price indexation B 0.6 0.1 0.4979 0.5264 0.3584 0.6925
ιw Wage indexation B 0.6 0.1 0.3079 0.3341 0.2192 0.4385
θp Price stickiness B 0.7 0.1 0.8046 0.8138 0.7620 0.8712
θw Wage stickiness B 0.7 0.1 0.8557 0.8557 0.8139 0.8983
Government policy
ρ MP smoothing B 0.7 0.1 0.7242 0.7274 0.6741 0.7828
τpi MP on inflation N 1.5 0.1 1.5508 1.5868 1.4453 1.7382
τy MP on output N 0.5 0.1 0.5723 0.5811 0.4313 0.7292
τ Size redistribution B 0.1 0.15 0.1571 0.1457 0.0683 0.2245
AR(1) shocks
ρa TFP B 0.60 0.20 0.9876 0.9842 0.9710 0.9985
ρφ Financial friction B 0.60 0.20 0.7398 0.7233 0.6600 0.7851
ρµ Investment specific B 0.60 0.20 0.8787 0.8688 0.8196 0.9183
ρλw Wage markup B 0.60 0.20 0.1803 0.2195 0.0537 0.3704
ρλp Price markup B 0.60 0.20 0.4906 0.4471 0.2408 0.6598
ρd Demand B 0.60 0.20 0.4710 0.4901 0.3060 0.6848
ρm Monetary policy B 0.60 0.20 0.5081 0.4929 0.3579 0.6337
Std shocks
σa TFP IG 0.50 1.00 0.0057 0.0059 0.0050 0.0067
σφ Financial friction IG 0.50 1.00 0.1844 0.1984 0.1518 0.2436
σµ Investment specific IG 0.50 1.00 0.0982 0.1011 0.0834 0.1193
σλw Wage markup IG 0.10 1.00 0.8051 0.9759 0.3414 1.6889
σλp Price markup IG 0.10 1.00 0.0466 0.0608 0.0251 0.1000
σd Demand IG 0.10 1.00 0.6141 0.0313 0.0210 0.0408
σr Monetary policy IG 0.10 1.00 0.0283 0.0032 0.0027 0.0037
σMEN ME on net worth IG 0.001 1.00 0.0117 0.0120 0.0103 0.0138
Notes: N stands for the Normal, B the Beta, G the Gamma and IG the inverted Gamma
distribution.
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deviations of shocks follow a relatively flat inverse gamma distribution with stan-
dard deviation of 1. The prior of the wage markup, price markup, demand and
monetary policy are all centered around 0.1. For TFP, financial friction and the
investment specific technology we use slightly higher values of 0.5. The mean for
the measurement error on net worth is taken from the variance of the underlying
data sample.
3.3.3 Posterior distribution
With the above specified prior distributions, we draw from the posterior dis-
tributions using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with two chains, each with
1,000,000 draws. In order to assess the convergence of the chains, we compute
several measures following (Brooks and Gelman, 1998). The interval of the pos-
terior distribution which is covered by the chains, as well as the second moment
of the posterior distribution, seem to be stable for most parameters after approx-
imately 500,000 draws. We report results based on the last 100,000 draws of each
chain.
The last columns of Table 3.1 report the posterior mode, the posterior mean,
and the lower and upper bounds of the 90% posterior density interval of the es-
timated parameters obtained by the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. Most of our
estimates are largely in line with similar estimates for the euro area (e.g. Smets
and Wouters, 2003; Coenen et al., 2018). In the Appendix we plot the prior and
the posterior distribution of each parameter.
Compared to the above two studies, we find for our data a slightly higher value of
habit and wage stickiness and much lower persistence of monetary policy (around
0.72 compared to above 0.9 in the other two studies). However, note that the
monetary policy shock is also persistent, therefore our parameters actually imply
a more persistent monetary policy response for a monetary policy shock. Ad-
ditionally, our quantitative simulations below do not change qualitatively if we
assume a higher monetary policy persistence. We estimate the degree of redis-
tribution τ ∼ 0.1527. This is relatively close to Leeper et al. (2010), who find
τ in the range 0.05 to 0.25 with a mean of 0.13 in a similar transfer rule for a
representative agent model.
27This is in principle the same number as in Gerke, Giesen and Scheer (2020). However, in
that paper τGGS20 is around 0.5 with the transfer rule Tht = τ
GGS20 (Yt − Y ) + Th. Here, we
use the transfer rule Tht =
τ
λ (Yt − Y ) + Th. Hence our value of τ is simply a scaled version
from Gerke et al. (2020), as the following holds: τGGS20 = τλ .
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For robustness, we estimated the model from 1999 to 2007 to check that the
estimates are not distorted by the financial crisis. Overall the parameters are
not that different and are within the posterior bands: there is in general less per-
sistence in the system (smaller AR(1) coefficients) and smaller nominal rigidities
(although the indexation parameter is high in either case). The redistribution
parameter τ is smaller (0.143 instead of 0.157). For a second robustness check,
we estimated the model from 1999 to 2014 with consumption instead of GDP as
observable. Again, the estimated parameters are not that different. A notable
exception is the size of redistribution, τ , which is reduced to 0.117. However,
even this smaller value for redistribution implies a reduction compared to the
representative version, as the next section makes clear (specifically, Figure 3.3).
3.4 Simulations
In order to assess the quantitative implications of hand-to-mouth consumers we
run several forward guidance simulations using the anticipated news approach
of Lase´en and Svensson (2011). We start with the impact forward guidance,
implemented as an interest rate peg of 25bps annually below steady state for
six quarters. This scenario is (as of June 2019) in essence similar to a cut in
the deposit facility rate of 25bps with an extension of forward guidance “until
the end of 2020”. According to recent estimates of EONIA forward curves, this
seems to be a plausible scenario for the euro area, see Lane (2019). We compare
this scenario within three models: ‘TANK + transfers’ (blue dotted line, i.e. our
estimated two-agent New Keynesian (TANK) model specified in section 3.2),
‘TANK’ (red solid-dotted line, no transfers, i.e. τ = 0) and ‘RANK’ (black solid
line, the Representative Agent New Keynesian (RANK) model with no hand-to-
mouth households, i.e. τ = λ = 0).
Figure 3.1 illustrates how such an expansionary forward guidance (upper left
panel) lowers long-term interest rates (upper middle panel) and thus stimulates
investment (upper right panel) and consumption (bottom left panel). This raises
real GDP (bottom middle panel) and inflation (bottom right panel). As one can
see, both TANK variants encompass the RANK model: the impact of forward
guidance is more pronounced in the TANK model (hence, the above mentioned
indirect effect dominates as in Bilbiie, 2019b) but less pronounced in our TANK
model with transfers (the direct effect dominates).
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 Figure 3.1: Simulated quarterly responses of aggregates in %-deviation from
steady state, if the interest rate is held 25bps annually below steady state for six
quarters.
 
Figure 3.2: Simulated quarterly responses for an interest rate peg of 25bps be-
low steady state for six quarters in %-deviation from steady state. It depicts
aggregate variables for RANK and the response of hand-to-mouth households
on TANK (red solid-dotted line) and Tank with transfers (blue dotted line) over
time (quarters).
The amplified (dampened) aggregate response can be explained if we examine
the strength of the indirect effect, i.e. by inspecting the constrained households’
total income and their consumption demand. Figure 3.2 depicts the response of
labor income, transfers and consumption only for the constrained households (for
both TANK models) and contrasts them to (the aggregate response in) RANK.
Focus on TANK first (no transfers, red solid-dotted line). The left panel reveals
that labor (and thus total) income of hand-to-mouth households increases com-
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Figure 3.3: Peak response of inflation (left panel) and output (right panel) for
different parameterized TANK models relative to our RANK model for eight
quarters of forward guidance. Values above 1 indicate an amplification (all in
bright yellow), values below 1 a dampening. The cross denotes estimated values.
pared to RANK, which raises their consumption demand (right panel) and thus
aggregate consumption, investment and income (red solid-dotted line in Figure
3.1). Therefore, although a smaller fraction of households smooths intertempo-
rally (which should per se dampen the aggregate effects of forward guidance), the
higher marginal propensity to consume of constrained households predominates.
Now, contrast these dynamics with the empirical TANK that includes counter-
cyclical transfers (blue dotted line). As the expansionary policy leads to a boom,
hand-to-mouth households receive less countercyclical transfers (middle panel),
so they reduce (relatively) their consumption demand (right panel). This feeds
back into a relatively smaller aggregate response and thus lower wage income
(left panel). The (relative) fall in labor income and transfers results in a rela-
tively small consumption response of hand-to-mouth households, which dampens
the impact on aggregate consumption (bottom left panel in Figure 3.1). Hence,
the direct effect outweighs the indirect one and the power of forward guidance is
attenuated.
To assess the contribution of the share of hand-to-mouth households λ and the
associated degree of countercyclical redistribution τ that is necessary to reduce
the power of forward guidance, Figure 3.3 contrasts the relative peak response
of inflation (left panel) and output (right panel) for eight quarters of forward
guidance with different combinations of λ and τ . A value above 1 (depicted
in bright yellow) indicates an amplification and a value below 1 a dampening
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relative to RANK.
There are two takeaways. First, there is a non-negligible parameter region where
the introduction of hand-to-mouth households amplifies the effects of forward
guidance, especially when redistribution is low. Second, the combination of a
high share of constrained households and significant redistribution leads to the
strongest reduction of the power of forward guidance. The crosses in the figure
highlight the values that were used for Figure 3.1 and 3.2. For this parameter
combination, the power of forward guidance is reduced by approximately 40%
compared to our RANK benchmark.28 However, the amount of attenuation
depends on the length of forward guidance. In case the central bank promises an
expansionary stance for only 6 quarters, the peak impact of inflation is reduced
by approximately 22%.
Although our TANK model with transfers can thus attenuate the power of for-
ward guidance, it does not resolve the so-called forward guidance puzzle (Del Ne-
gro et al., 2015), see Figure 3.4. This figure depicts for all three model variants
(‘RANK’, ‘TANK’, ‘TANK+transfer’) an exponentially increasing peak impact of
three consecutive rate cuts on consumption (left panel), inflation (middle panel)
and output (right panel), at different horizons at which these cuts occur. As
one can see, even though the peak impact is reduced in the estimated TANK
model with transfers (blue dotted line) compared to the pure TANK model (red
solid-dotted line), the impact is still increasing the further away the cuts oc-
cur. Hence, to actually resolve the puzzle in our model, one would probably
have to add uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk to the model (as in a HANK
model), that triggers a yet missing self-insurance mechanism (as shown for a
simple TANK analytically by Bilbiie, 2019a).
In a last scenario we illustrate the interaction of forward guidance (FG) with as-
set purchases (APP), as observed in recent years. As a baseline, we simulate the
impact of the Eurosystem’s asset purchase program as of early 2015 (similar to
Sahuc, 2016), within our estimated TANK model with transfers (blue solid line
in Figure 3.5). The purchases (upper left panel) stimulate investment through
portfolio-rebalancing (not shown), which raises real GDP (not shown) and in-
flation (bottom left and right panel). As a result, the policy rate also increases
(upper right panel).
28In McKay et al. (2016) the HANK model reduces the initial impact of their forward guid-
ance experiment by 60% compared to their RANK model.
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 Figure 3.4: Simulated peak responses for different horizons of forward guidance
on three consecutive rate cuts of 25bps. The horizontal axis depicts the respective
horizon when the cuts occur, the vertical one the impact in % relative to steady
state.
 
Figure 3.5: Simulated response of APP and APP with FG (interest rate set
25bps below the steady state for six and eight quarters). The horizontal axis
depicts quarters, the vertical one the impact in % relative to steady state. The
blue solid line depicts the response of the APP-baseline scenario, the blue dashed
(blue dotted) line the interaction with six (eight) quarters FG. The green solid-
cross and solid-circle lines depict the sum of the APP-baseline and an isolated
FG impact of a 25bps cut for six and eight quarters, respectively.
We compare these responses with a scenario where we additionally keep the in-
terest rate 25bps annually below steady state for six quarters (blue dashed line)
and eight quarters (blue dotted line). In both cases, as expected, the simulta-
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neous use of APP and FG raises GDP (not shown) and inflation (bottom left
and right panel, respectively) above the baseline scenario. However, it is note-
worthy that the impact is higher than the sum of each policy used in isolation
(the green solid-cross line for six quarters FG and the solid-circle line for eight
quarters, respectively). The reason is twofold. First, monetary policy is more
accommodative as it lowers interest rates by more than 25bps (APP per se raises
policy rates). Second, this additional stimulus becomes reinforced due to the in-
terest rate peg, as the rise of the inflation rate induces a further reduction in real
interest rates, which amplifies the stimulus. This second amplification channel
explains why the difference between the interaction and the sum of the isolated
policies increases with the horizon of forward guidance (i.e. the difference be-
tween ‘APP + 8QFG’ and ‘sum(APP, 8QFG)’ is higher than between ‘APP +
6QFG’ and ‘sum(APP, 6QFG)’).29
3.5 Conclusion and discussion
We have introduced hand-to-mouth households into a medium-scale New Keyne-
sian DSGE model with banks to study the quantitative implications of forward
guidance. We also study its combination with asset purchases. Such a two-agent
New Keynesian model approximates the aggregate effects of heterogeneous agents
models in a parsimonious way. We show that for plausible ranges of parameters
the power of forward guidance can be dampened compared to our representative
agent benchmark model. However, the amount of attenuation depends on the
degree of countercyclical transfers and the share of hand-to-mouth households.
This is because the two parameters shape the relative strength of the direct and
indirect effects of interest rate forward guidance (Bilbiie, 2019b). If there is no
or “too little” redistribution, models with hand-to-mouth households amplify the
impact of forward guidance on the economy relative to a representative agent
benchmark.
A further taming is possible if monetary policy is history dependent. An inertial
reaction of the central bank will carry its endogenous feedback of interest rates
into the future after the forward guidance period (similar to Bilbiie, 2019a).
29The isolated impact of the APP on inflation is around 0.14%. The isolated impact of a
25bps reduction in the short rate for six / eight quarters is around 0.06% / 0.12%, respectively.
However, the combination of APP and forward guidance raises inflation by 0.39% and 0.82%,
respectively.
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As many central banks indeed emphasize a medium-term goal of their inflation
targets, we estimated a version of the above model with a Taylor rule that reacts
to a four-quarter average of the past inflation rates (e.g. Justiniano et al., 2013).
Our results indeed indicate a further taming of the power of forward guidance.
However, the forward guidance puzzle remains unsolved. We leave a thorough
analysis of the quantitative implications of different monetary policy rules and
strategies for future work.
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Appendices
3.A Model appendix
Λot = dt
1
Cot − hCot−1
− Etdt+1 hβ
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(38)
Λot = βΛ
o
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Rt
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110
Lt =
1
1 + (Φt − 1)Et R
L
t+1
Rt
(60)
P kt I
o
t = F¯t − κ
F¯t−1
Πt
Qt
Qt−1
(61)
Λot
(
1 +Nt
(
Ψn
Nt −N
N
)
+
ψN
2
(
Nt −N
N
)2)
= βζΛot+1
1
Πt+1
((
RLt+1 −Rt
)
Lt +Rt
)
(62)
RLt =
1 + κQt
Qt−1
(63)
MPLt = (1− α)At
(
Kt−1
Ht
)α
(64)
MPKt = αAt
(
Kt−1
Ht
)α−1
(65)
Rt = (Rt−1)
ρ
(
RΠτpit
(
Yt
Yt−1
)τy)1−ρ
εRt (66)
It = (1− λ)Iot (67)
Kt = (1− λ)Kot (68)
Ct = (1− λ)Cot + λCht (69)
Λht = dt
1
Cht
(70)
Cht = d
w
t wtHt − T ht − τ (Yt − Y ) (71)
111
dwt = θwΠ
−ιwεw
t−1
(
wt
wt−1
Πt
)εw
dwt−1 + (1− θw)
1
1−εw
(
1− θw
(
Πιwt−1
wt−1
wtΠt
)1−εw) εwεw−1
(72)
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dt = (1− ρd) ln(d) + ρddt−1 + d,t (80)
3.A.1 Steady states
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3.B Numerical implementation of anticipated
shocks
To simulate forward guidance paths we follow the approach by Lase´en and Svens-
son (2011), which was implemented for instance by Krause and Moyen (2016).
Start with a model without news shocks that (in its linear form and no constant)
can be written as follows:
Axt = Bxt−1 +DEtxt+1 + Fεt (117)
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with the reduced form solution
xt = Qxt−1 +Gεt (118)
To conduct forward guidance in such a model, the monetary policy rule (which,
for simplicity, is given by rt = φpipit) will be augmented by past announcements
of changes in the interest rate, that all realize in t (Harrison, 2015):
rt = φpipit + ε¯
r
t (119)
with
ε¯rt =
J−1∑
j=0
νrj,t−j. (120)
The general notation is that the value after the comma denotes the time of
announcement “, t − j” and the value before the comma the time until the an-
nouncement realizes (“j,”, i.e. in t − j + j = t). Thus, the disturbance νrj,t−j
represents an announcement in t − j that affects the policy rate in j periods.
Put differently, the shock is known by the agents in t− j, but the change in the
interest rate takes place in period (t− j) + j = t.30 The term νr0,t is similar to a
monetary policy shock.
Past announcements of future interest rate adjustments become part of the state
space and are denoted by νt−1:
νt = {νri,t−j}i,j∈{1,...,J−1}, i ≥ j (121)
This vector includes all announcements from the past, i.e. in t − 1 or earlier
(captured by “, t − j”) that affect the policy rate in t or later (captured by “i,”,
the time until it realizes).
The model with news shocks is then an extended version of eq (117), to include
a block of policy rule shocks νt and states ν
t:
[A Aν ][xt ν
t]′ = [B Bν ][xt−1 νt−1]′ + [D Dν ]Et[xt+1 νt+1]′ + [F Fν ][εt νt]′ (122)
with
νt = {νr0,t, νr1,t, . . . , νrJ−1,t} (123)
30However, as the model is forward-looking, such an announcement has an impact on the
economy already from t− j onwards.
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In short:
A˜x˜t = B˜x˜t−1 + D˜Etx˜t+1 + F˜ ε˜t (124)
with the solution given by:
x˜t = Q˜x˜t−1 + [G Gν ][εt νt]′ (125)
We assume now that the central bank can actually choose the news shocks νt
directly and denote such a vector with:
ν¯T = [ν¯
r
0,T , ν¯
r
1,T , . . . , ν¯
r
J−1,T ]
′. (126)
These are J announcements for the policy rate that are announced in the be-
ginning of period T . Importantly, households take these announcements into
account, i.e. – in contrast to exogenous shocks – ET−1ν¯T = ν¯T . Therefore, the
h-period ahead model-based forecast x˜T+h,T−1 is now given by:
x˜T+h,T−1 = Q˜h
(
Q˜x˜T−1 +Gν ν¯T
)
= Q˜h+1x˜T−1 + Q˜hGν ν¯T , h = 0, . . . , J − 1.31
(127)
Since rt is part of x˜t, it holds for those periods
rT+h,T−1 = Q˜h+1r x˜T−1 + Q˜
h
rGν,rν¯T , (128)
with Q˜r denoting the respective row of matrix Q˜ and Gν,r of Gν . This implies
that for a given vector ν¯T , equation (128) determines the (anticipated) path of
the policy rate. Put differently, if the policymaker wants the interest rate to
follow a pre-specified path, like
rT+h,T−1 = r¯T+h, h = 0, . . . , J − 1. (129)
he has to choose the announcements ν¯T such that (129) is satisfied.
Stacking all J equations from (128) into a single matrix leads to:
31Since the central bank announces its path for J periods, we focus on the forecast horizon
until T + J − 1. Harrison (2015) also focuses on situations in which H 6= J , where H is the
forecasting horizon.
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
Q˜r
Q˜2r
...
Q˜Jr
 · x˜T−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A∗Jx1
+

Gν, r
Q˜rGν,r
...
Q˜J−1r Gν,r

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B∗JxJ
·ν¯T =

r¯T
r¯T+1
...
r¯T+J−1

︸ ︷︷ ︸
r¯TJx1
⇔ A∗ +B∗ν¯T = r¯T
Since this is a linear model (with unique solution), one can invert matrix B∗ to
solve for the policy vector ν¯T :
ν¯T = (B
∗)−1 (r¯T − A∗) (130)
3.C Additional Figures
Figure 3.6: Prior vs. posterior distribution
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the posterior distribution.
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Figure 3.7: Univariate convergence statistics.
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Figure 3.8: Multivariate convergence statistics.
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